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How has that sentiment [for peace] told on the direct action of
nations? How far have they shaped their policy according to its
methods? The answers to these questions are also hopeful and en-
couraging. Experience has shown that over a large area interna-
tional differences may honourably, practically, and usefully be
dealt with by peaceful arbitrament.
Unbridled ambition, thirst for wide dominion, pride of power,
still hold sway, although I believe with lessened force, and in
some sort under the restraint of the healthier opinion of the
world. But, further, friend as I am of peace, I would yet affirm
that there may be even greater calamities than war-the dishon-
our of a nation, the triumph of an unrighteous cause, the, perpet-
uation of hopeless and debasing tyranny.1
-Lord Russell of Killowen
1 1 J. GILLIS WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 9
(1979) (excerpts from speech by Lord Russell of Killowen, On the Sentiment for Peace and
In Favour of Arbitration as the Alternative for War, made on August 20, 1896).
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This Article is in agreement with Lord Russell that arbitration
between nations constitutes one of the rare occasions when inter-
national law abandons its nobility in favor of practicality. Below,
this Article analyzes the dispute settlement mechanism under the
United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement of 1985 ("U.S.-Israel
FTA") in comparison with other international arbitration institu-
tions. The uniqueness of the arbitration forum under that agree-
ment, as a continuous, peaceful, and cooperative dispute resolution
between the United States and its major ally in the Middle East,
places it in a position to serve as a framework for the creation of
similar institutions under future Middle East regional peace agree-
ments and other trade arrangements between Israel and its neigh-
boring Arab countries.
The following criticism and suggested modifications are ex-
pressly based on: (1) the proven success of arbitration institutions
in defusing international tensions; (2) the need for a detailed set of
well-tested procedural rules, from the first stage of the arbitration
process to its binding conclusion; (3) the fairness in giving private-
sector entities and individuals the right to initiate a dispute and
the right of access to the forum during proceedings; and (4) the
importance of publishing the panels' final and binding decisions.
As shown below, the procedure of dispute resolution under the
U.S.-Israel FTA, in its present form, is substantially lacking on all
fronts, does not offer competent means for resolving a substantial,
unsettled trade dispute, and therefore reflects the "reluctance by
political officials to let their interests in a dispute get out of the
control of their own diplomacy for final determination by others."'2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area
between the governments of the United States and Israel3 ("FTA"
or the "Agreement") was entered into on April 22, 1985 and was
implemented by Congress4 in accordance with sections 102 and 151
of the Trade Act of 1974.5 The FTA is aimed at strengthening and
2 Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 187 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing reasons for na-
tions' avoidance from submission to jurisdiction of International Court of Justice).
3 U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 657 [here-
inafter U.S.-Israel FTA].
4 United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47,
99 Stat. 82 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202).
1 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191).
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developing the economic relations between the United States and
Israel for their mutual benefit by establishing a free trade area be-
tween the two nations through the removal of trade barriers.
Since the establishment of Israel as a State in 1948, Israel has
had a close relationship with the United States. The United States
has consistently and visibly aided Israel, both economically and
militarily. Being the only democratic government in the Middle
East, Israel's existence has been considered by the United States
to be a major factor in preserving the political stability and the
balance of military power in the area where the industrial West
buys most of its oil. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Israel played a strategic role in the Cold War, providing a major
stronghold for the U.S. in its battle for influence in the region.'
The Agreement is one between the governments of the United
States and Israel and does not offer any remedies for the benefit of
other parties, such as private-sector entities. It establishes a Joint
Committee' to supervise the implementation of the FTA and to
review trade relations between the parties; it provides for consulta-
tions in the event of a dispute and for a referral of unresolved dis-
putes to a "conciliation panel."" The FTA provides, however, that
any other "applicable international dispute settlement mecha-
nism" may be invoked by either party with respect to any matter,
and that in such a case "the mechanism invoked shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over that matter."'10
This Article discusses dispute resolution under the FTA, with
particular consideration given to the advantages and the disadvan-
tages of invoking the dispute settlement mechanism under the
FTA itself, as is, and proposes improvements and additions to its
existing provisions. Special consideration is given to exploring ave-
nues through which private-sector entities, which are active in
trade between Israel and the United States, may seek access to and
remedies under the dispute resolution mechanism established by
the FTA.
6 See Howard F. Rosen, The US-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement: How Well Is It
Working and What Have We Learned?, in FRm TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY 97
(Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1989).
1 See United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement Act of 1985, § 5(d), Pub. L. No. 99-
47, 99 Stat. 82; see also U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 5, 24 I.L.M. at 658-59; infra
notes 389 to 428 and accompanying text (discussing private causes of action).
U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 17, 24 I.L.M. at 663-64.
Id. arts. 18, 19, 24 I.L.M. at 664-65.
10 Id. art. 19, § 1(f), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
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The FTA's dispute resolution mechanism deserves special at-
tention as a unique form of continuous implementation of an inter-
national agreement to which Israel is a party. The ongoing Middle
East peace talks, if successful, will produce numerous agreements
between Israel and its neighbors, regulating complex issues such as
military forces, conventional and unconventional arms, territorial
sovereignty, water resources, economic and trade relations, and ag-
riculture cooperation. It is hoped that these agreements will create
a 'Middle East Economic Community' by establishing a unified ec-
onomic and free trade zone. Such agreements would require a long
process of implementation through the use of joint committees and
continuous dispute resolution.
The following discussion of the U.S.-Israel FTA's dispute reso-
lution mechanism, the comparison made with provisions of other
international agreements and institutional arbitration rules, and
the suggestions made for modifications and improvements will
hopefully serve the negotiators of future Middle East regional
agreements as a framework for the establishment of sufficiently so-
phisticated and competent dispute resolution mechanisms. The ex-
isting adversarial atmosphere and deep emotional animosity, which
is expected to govern the implementation of those regional agree-
ments in their first decade or two, make the establishment of a
comprehensive, effective, and detailed dispute resolution mecha-
nism an essential element of their success and, therefore, an essen-
tial condition to the preservation of a lasting peace in the Middle
East. The natural riches of the region, together with low-cost labor
and easy access to international markets, if supplemented by polit-
ical stability and economic cooperation, could revive the region's
past glories and lead the Middle East into an era of dramatic
prosperity.
II. THE FTA-GENERAL"l
A. Conception and Structure
In November 1983, President Reagan and Israel's Prime Min-
ister Shamir agreed to discuss the establishment of a bilateral free
trade area between the United States and Israel. The Trade and
n1 For a detailed economic and political overview of the FTA, see ORrT FRENKEL, CON-
STRAINTS AND COMPROMISES: TRADE POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY, THE CASE OF THE U.S.-ISRAEL
FREE TRADE AREA 57-63, 161-83 (1990).
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Tariff Act of 1984 authorized the President to conclude a free
trade agreement with Israel providing for elimination of tariffs and
non-tariff barriers in trade.
Generally, a free trade area is a bilateral arrangement between
two governments which provides for mutual removal of tariff and
other trade barriers with respect to goods and services originating
in the other country (party to the agreement). It does not interfere
directly with trade relations that each party has with other coun-
tries or with political sovereignty, and is not designed to achieve
economic or political harmonization. 12 For that very reason, free
trade agreements are considered an excellent vehicle for achieving
economic growth and success, without seceding political indepen-
dence and national pride.13 During an interview with The Wall
Street Journal, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who is the cur-
rent chairman of the 1992 economic summit of the "Group of
Seven" industrial nations, stated: "As a matter of principle, free
world trade is the decisive precondition for world-wide prosper-
ity."1 4 These words reflect a widely accepted view that free trade
agreements will become increasingly popular among nations and
therefore escalate in number. Free trade agreements are perceived
not merely as economic tools, but also as political arrangements.
Such foreign policy considerations stand behind the United States
administration's drive to establish free trade "from Alaska to
Tierra del Fuego."'
With similar hopes in mind, the presidents of Brazil, Argen-
tina, Uruguay, and Paraguay have agreed to create a common mar-
ket for a major part of South America, including the dropping of
tariffs and the harmonization of tax and customs systems.'0
12 See Avrahamn Azrieli, Dispute Resolution Under Chapter 18 of the Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARE. 419, 421-22 (1991) (discussing optional
structures of trade customs and economic unions); see also Oarr FRENKEL, supra note 11, at
9-42, 98-160 (discussing U.S.-Israel FTA as framework for U.S. administration's trade
policy).
12 See generally JAN TUMLIR, PROTECTIONISM: TRADE POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC SoCIETIEs
(1985) (discussing benefits of free trade agreements).
14 Karen E. House & Philip Revzin, Germany's Kohl Shapes Its New Role, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 7, 1992, at A10.
"I Marc Levinson, Let's Have No More Free Trade Deals, Please, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17,
1992, at 40. Indeed, Levinson warns against expanding the Free Trade Zone beyond Mex-
ico's southern border, advocating a stronger American interest in gaining easier trade access
to China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the European Community. See id.
16 See Nathaniel C. Nash, Free-Trade Talks in South America, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29,
1992, at D2.
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Both Israel and the United States are member signatories to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). The
GATT permits its signatories, under certain conditions, to agree on
the creation of a free trade area or a "customs-union" between
them.17 The GATT permits the creation of free trade areas despite
the fact that such agreements constitute deviation from its princi-
pal idea, namely, nondiscrimination.
The GATT sets specific conditions for the creation of contrac-
tual free trade areas or customs-unions by its signatories: (1) duties
and other restrictive trade regulations with respect to "substan-
tially all" the trade activity between the parties must be elimi-
nated; and (2) duties and other regulations of commerce main-
tained by the parties may not be higher or more restrictive to the
trade of third countries than those in place prior to the
agreement."8
The FTA between Israel and the United States is the first
such arrangement entered into by the United States with any
country (with the exception of the limited bilateral arrangement
with Canada in the automotive sector)."' The Agreement provides
that its language shall govern in the case of any inconsistency with
other agreements, such as the GATT, though the parties reaf-
firmed their respective rights and obligations under the GATT,
which would govern any issue not addressed by the FTA.20
Israel and the United States are both parties to the interna-
tional "Government Procurement Code," which provides for the
reciprocal waiver of "buy national" restrictions for a broad range
of purchases.2 The FTA provides that the parties will further
eliminate trade restrictions associated with government procure-
ment by lowering, on a bilateral basis, the threshold for the appli-
cation of the Government Procurement Code, by eliminating bina-
tional restrictions with respect to purchases of non-military
products by Israel's Ministry of Defense, and by relaxing the offset
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIV, 61 Stat. A3, A66-
A68 [hereinafter GATT].
18 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Summary of U.S.-Israel Free
Trade Agreement, 24 I.L.M. 654 (1985) [hereinafter Summary].
19 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 116; infra notes 111-121 and accompanying text (Part
II). Note that article 1 of the U.S.-Israel FTA specifies article XXIV(8)(b) of the GATT as
the basis and the framework for the creation of the free trade area.
20 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 3, 24 LL.M. at 658.
21 See Summary, supra note 18, at 655.
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requirements with respect to civilian agency procurement.22 The
FTA further sets restrictions for agricultural policy, 23 a right to im-
pose, based on the principles of national treatment, import restric-
tions for the purpose of Kosher dietary laws,24 and restrictions on
governmental incentives and subsidies.25 Finally, the Agreement
sets the rules for dispute settlement procedure. 26 In A separate An-
nex to the Agreement, it establishes the rules of origin,27 drafted to
be consistent with the directions provided by Congress, which are
set forth in Title IV of the Trade and Tariff Agreement of 198428
and based upon those provided by the Caribbean Basin Initiative
with minor modifications.
29
B. Effect and Expectations
Due to the disproportionate size of the parties with respect to
territory, population, and gross national product ("GNP"),30 the
scope of trade between the United States and Israel provides for a
substantially greater percentage of international trading-volume
for Israel as compared with the United States." In 1985, when the
Agreement came into force, the United States was Israel's largest
trading partner, providing a market for about 25% of Israel's total
exports and supplying about 20% of its total nonmilitary imports.
Earlier, when the initiative to create the FTA came in 1982, the
United States trade surplus with Israel was about $400 million, ex-
22 See id. art. 15, 24 I.L.M. at 662-63. The FTA further provides that no new trade
restrictions may be applied bilaterally, except as permitted by the terms of the agreement or
by the GATT. Id. art. 4, 24 I.L.M. at 658.
23 Id. art. 6, 24 I.L.M. at 659.
24 Id. art. 8, 24 I.L.M. at 659.
2. Id. art. 13, 24 I.L.M. at 662.
2 Id. arts. 17-19, 24 I.L.M. at 663-65.
2 Id. annex 3, 24 I.L.M. at 669-73 (rules for determining which goods have their origins
in party-country, and therefore within scope of Agreement).
28 See Summary, supra note 18, at 655.
29 H.R. REP. No. 64, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 61;
see also Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 stat. 384 (1983)
(authorizing Caribbean Basin Initiative which provides one-way, duty-free entry into United
States).
3' This may well change in view of the geo-political volatility of the Middle East and
the possibilities engulfed in the proposition of creating a "Middle East Economic
Community."
32 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 110. Data for 1987 shows that one-third of Israel's total
exports went to the U.S., whereas only approximately one-half of one percent of total U.S.
exports went to Israel. Id.
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cluding military goods.3 2
The establishment of a bilateral free trade area with respect to
industrial and certain agricultural products between the European
Communities ("EC") and Israel in 1975, which reached its full im-
plementation in 1989, created another incentive for the United
States to create the FTA with Israel. "The economic advantage to
the United States of a free trade area is elimination of relatively
high tariff barriers on nearly one-half of United States exports to
Israel and removal of the EC duty-free competitive advantage in
the Israeli market, particularly in industrial products which di-
rectly compete with the EC."33 For Israel, bilateral trade agree-
ments are essential since it cannot trade with its neighbors and
because of the limitations on its international trade activity due to
the existence of the Arab boycott.3 4
Data for 1989 shows that Israel spent 25% of its GNP on de-
fense. It receives a major part of the total United States foreign
aid-more than any other country. United States foreign aid funds
constitute 20% of Israel's total government budget.3 5 Available
data for 1990 shows that the United States trade deficit with Israel
was $112 million, which is $296 million lower than in 1989.36
The scope of trade between the parties shows similar growth:
exports of United States goods to Israel, for 1990, totaled $3.2 bil-
lion, which is $396 million (or 13.0%) higher compared to 1989.11
Nonmilitary United States exports to Israel grew $203 million in
1990, reaching a total of $2.36 billion.3 8 For 1990, therefore, almost
18% of Israel's total imports came from the United States (com-
pared to 16.6% in 1989). Israeli exports to the United States (in-
"2 See H.R. REP. No. 64, supra note 29, at 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 62-64
(Trade Benefits Under Agreement); see also FRENKEL, supra note 11, at 133-43. Data for
1991 show that trade between the two countries grew 13%, which brings the total growth
since the implementation of the Agreement to 45%. U.S. Benefits from Free Trade with
Israel, OPPORTUNrrIEs IN ISRAEL, Oct. 1992 (publication of the Israeli Ministry of Finance).
33 H.R. REP. No. 64, supra note 29, at 4, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 64.
31 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 116.
" See International Relationships, 1989 International Business Communications
(Holdings) US, Inc., Country Report (Mar. 1, 1989). Note that, unlike Germany, Saudi Ara-
bia, and other nations, Israel traditionally refused U.S. requests to allow stationing of U.S.
forces on its soil to protect U.S. strategic interests. Thus, the protection of such interests
could be done only through "foreign aid" invested in the reinforcement of Israel's defense
forces, which artificially inflated Israel's share in the total U.S. foreign aid budget. Id.
36 Id.
37 See Katherine Fitz-Gerald-Wilks, High Technology Products Continue to Be Best
Prospects, BusiNEss AriERICA, Apr. 22, 1991, at 23.
38 Id.
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cluding military) totaled $3.3 billion, which constituted a 2.3% in-
crease from 1989.1e That data shows (1) a constant rise in the
scope of trade between the parties, and (2) a close balance between
the scope of imports and exports between the countries. 40 The
FTA, which took effect on September 1, 1985, provides for a grad-
ual elimination of the trade barriers between the United States
and Israel, which will be completed in 1995. The currently availa-
ble data, which reflects only partial implementation of the FTA,
already shows the positive impact of the FTA.4'
Unrelated to the FTA, up until 1985, Israel went through a
period of high inflation and economic instability. In 1985, at about
the same time the FTA was enacted, the government of Israel im-
plemented what was called the "Economic Stabilization Program."
Since then, the yearly inflation, previously at 1000%, has been less
than 20% .42 Though it is impossible to determine whether the
FTA alone has produced the increase in trade between the parties
and certain other improvements in Israel's economy, and even
though economic data do not offer any proof of a significant bene-
fit to either country, it is still evident that the purpose and some of
the goals set by the governments of the United States and Israel in
contemplating the FTA have been achieved.43 The FTA is a dy-
namic trade integration process whose fruits are to ripen over de-
cades, yet some economic indicators already show limited gains in
consumer surplus and some welfare improvements for Israel, to-
gether with substantial prospects for expanding markets for both
countries, and increases in foreign investments.44 For example, the
FTA has produced, though indirectly, substantial growth in foreign
investment in Israel. A recent survey shows that foreign invest-
ment in Israel has increased significantly since 1986, with an accel-
erated increase in 1988-1,989.1' The survey points to 1985 as a turn-
ing point due to both the government's economic stabilization plan
" See id. See also Katherine Fitz-Gerald-Wilks, Israel-U.S. Market Share Grows
Under Free Trade Agreement, BUSINESS AMERICA, Apr. 23, 1990, at 47.
40 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE EsTI-
MATE REPORT, FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 115 (1991).
41 Id.
4" See Rosen, supra note 6, at 107.
43 Id. at 104-10.
41 See FRENKEL, supra note 11, at 60, 63-89.
,5 KPMG PEAT MARWICK AND KESSELMAN & KESSELMAN, ISRAELI COMPANIES WITH FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT SURVEY 1991, at 18 (1991).
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and the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. 46 Addition-
ally, the survey emphasizes the share of United States private sec-
tor investment and the outstanding growth'in high-tech invest-
ments.47 Israel's foreign trade activity during the years 1985 to
1990, in both imports and exports, showed similar results: over half
of Israel's imports and nearly half of Israel's exports were ex-
changed with Europe, whereas North America and the rest of the
world equally shared the remainder.48
Providing the Middle East enjoys relative political stability,
experts predict that Israel can expect tremendous economic growth
in the coming years because it enjoys not only richness in its
skilled and reliable labor force, especially engineers and technology
experts, but also experienced management personnel and a sub-
stantial influx of immigrants from the former Soviet Union.49 In
the last two years, Israel has accommodated 380,000 immigrants
from the Soviet Union and an additional 600,000 are expected in
the next three years. It is estimated that about 30,000 of these im-
migrants are physicians, another 45,000 are technicians, and about
150,000 are scientists and engineers.50 "The glut of emigrants en-
tering the job market and the fact that tens of thousands of them
cannot find work commensurate with their training and back-
ground-or any job at all-means that many Israeli employers are
able to hire highly trained workers at significantly lower wages
than they have been paying. ' '51
Additionally, Israel offers substantial incentives to business
start-ups. Israel provides generous grants for the purchase of
plants and equipment and funds for research and development.
Tax incentives are offered, especially for foreign investors, reduc-
ing the corporate income tax to either 0% or 10% compared to
38% in the United States and 62% in Europe.2 Finally, a recent
46 Id. at 14-16.
47 Id. at 21.
48 See id. at 34.
49 See Felix Zandman, Israel, A Good Place to Set Up Shop. Really., WALL ST. J., Nov.
25, 1991, at A12.
60 See Peter Passell, How Welcome Mat Aids Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at D1.
"1 Amy D. Marcus, Lower-Paid Russian Immigrants Offer Competitive Edge to Some
Israeli Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, .1992, at A7.
2 See Zandman, supra note 49, at A12; KPMG PEAT MARWICK AND KESSELMAN & KES-
SELMAN, supra note 45, at 46-50; see also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIST IN THE MINISTRY OF
INDUSTRY AND TRADE, ISRAEL INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, A NATIONAL CHAL-
LENGE (1991). See generally JOEL Y. MARYLES, FURMAN SELZ, INC., ISRAEL: THE NEXT Eco-
NOMIC DRAGON (1991) (discussing tax incentives).
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Salomon Brothers' report strongly advocates reconsidering Israel's
classification as a developing country, and treating it as a full
member of the club of industrialized democracies."' The report, re-
lying on 1990 data, points out that Israel's per capita gross domes-
tic product ("GDP") of $10,700 is only slightly less than that of the
United Kingdom and Australia, is on par with that of New Zea-
land, and is higher than that of Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Its
total GDP of $50 billion makes Israel an equivalent of New Zea-
land, Portugal, and Ireland.5 4 The report further indicates that the
average life expectancy in Israel in 1987 was 75.4 years, which is
equal to that of the United States, slightly above that of the
United Kingdom (75.2 years) and only slightly below that of Aus-
tralia (76.1 years).5 The report also emphasizes the high quality
education in Israel.5 6 For example, secondary school enrollment
was 83% in 1986, which is equivalent to the United Kingdom, and
8% of all Israelis have a university degree.5 The report advocates
an upgrading of Israel's credit by Standard & Poor's to the Single-
A category, based also on the positive geo-political conditions.5
In summary, Israel's position as a growth economy, together
with its unique position as having free trade arrangements both
with the United States and the European Community, its unique
status as an immigration country, and its positive prospects for
peace with its neighbors, position Israel on high grounds for trade
cooperation with the United States. It follows that the FTA should
not be viewed solely in the context of the parties' mutual trade,
but as a part of a global free trade area and a framework for com-
prehensive regional agreements. In that context, it is essential to
create a competent dispute settlement mechanism under the FTA,
which would provide an expedient, binding arbitration procedure
to be conducted by experts capable of dealing with complex eco-
nomic, political, and legal issues. Such a mechanism would become
63 JOHN F. PURCELL ET. AL., SALOMON BROTHERS, SOVEREIGN ASSESSMENT GROUP, ISRAEL:
A MISUNDERSTOOD CREDIT 1 (1991).
4 Id.
55 Id.
58 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2.
See generally YEHUDA RAVEN & CO. AND KESSELMAN & KESSELMAN, FRIE TRADE BE-
TWEEN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, THE FAR EAST AND OTHER COUNTRIES VIA ISRAEL, RE-
VIEW TOWARDS 1992 (1991) (summarizing Israel's free trade agreements and suggesting
Israel be used as "trade bridge" in future).
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a model for other international agreements, including Middle East
regional peace treaties. As discussed below, the dispute settlement
mechanism under the FTA in its current form lacks the efficiency,
sophistication, and openness essential for successfully fulfilling this
role.
III. RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BY THE UNITED
STATES AND ISRAEL
The settlement of disputes between States through arbitra-
tion comprises the only means for the elimination of international
controversy through resort to law and judicial procedures. In a
world which has too long and too often had recourse to force to
settle conflicts it furnishes the avenue whereby States may bring
themselves under a reign of law in the solution of their disputes.
Not political persuasion or coercion through the use of power in
whatever form, but the application of legal principles in a judicial
manner is the strength of international arbitration. Not negotia-
tion and compromise, but reason and justice constitutes its ap-
peal to States.6
A. United States
Historically, the absence of statutory commercial arbitration
in the United States led its courts to treat arbitration clauses in
commercial contracts as an unwarranted avoidance of the judicial
system and thus to limit their enforceability.6 1 Common law af-
forded arbitration agreements very little value, refusing to subject
them to specific performance.2  That unfavorable approach
changed once statutory enactments of arbitration laws were gradu-
ally passed in many states63 and by Congress. 4 These laws have
60 1 WErER, supra note 1, at 5 (quoting KENNETH S. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION 264 (1946)).
61 See Kulukundis Shipping Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir.
1942) (stating that English and other early decisions have narrowly construed terms of arbi-
tration agreements). See generally Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice and
Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155 (1970); William C. Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial
Arbitration in New York: A Brief Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 215 (1956).
62 See, e.g., S.M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff, 174 N.E.2d 478 (N.Y. 1961).
63 MARTIN DoMKE, DoIuKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, App.L (Gabriel M. Wilner ed.,
1984) (comprehensive list of state arbitration laws).
" Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991) (as amended). The
original Federal Arbitration Act was passed on February 12, 1925. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, 43
Stat. 883. Note, e.g., chapter 3 of the Act implementing the Inter-America Convention on
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made arbitration a useful, efficient, and expedient means of resolv-
ing commercial disputes in the United States. Today, agreements
to submit future disputes to arbitration are irrevocable, enforcea-
ble by state and federal courts, and constitute a valid basis for ob-
taining a stay of judicial proceedings; a final arbitration award is
unreviewable as to its merits and procedure, subject to only few
exceptions involving gross procedural unfairness and fraud. 5
In the international commercial arbitration arena, the United
States is a signatory party to the United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award (the
"New York Convention"), 66 is a party to numerous other conven-
tions and treaties that include arbitration clauses, and is a signa-
tory to numerous forums of alternative dispute resolution in the
international arena.6 7
The United States has recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, for example, in its dispute with Canada
over boundaries.6 8 However, as a result of its dissatisfaction with
the International Court's handling of the Nicaragua litigation (in
which the United States opposed the International Court's exercise
of jurisdiction on technical grounds), the United States terminated
International Commercial Arbitration, adopted Jan. 30, 1975. 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (Supp. MI
1991).
61 See DOMKE, supra note 63, §§ 3:01-4:05 (comprehensive survey of developments in
common law and statutory commercial arbitration law).
" United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 7, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (implemented as 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1988)) [hereinafter New York Convention]. For a general discussion of the New York Con-
vention, see Joseph T. McLaughlin & Laurie Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
under the New York Convention-Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 249
(1986).
67 See, e.g., Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1779; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199; Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 16,
1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 380; Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055 (creating permanent Court of Arbitration); see also Fred L. Morrison, Treaties
as a Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in U.S. Practice, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 58 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987); Fred L. Morrison, Potential Revi-
sions to the Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Jus-
tice by United States of America, in UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 29 (Anthony C. Arend ed., 1986); MICHAEL DUNNE,
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1935 (1988); Thomas M. Franck & Jerome M.
Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace Through Law,
in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 3 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
68 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12).
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its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 9 The United
States is a party to the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, (an
agency which was created by the World Bank),70 and to the Proto-
col of Provisional Application of the GATT, which established the
framework for international trade relations.7 1 The United States
has also gradually implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration.72
In addition, the United States has entered into a free trade
agreement with Canada.73 That agreement has tremendous eco-
nomic importance since Canada is the largest purchaser of Ameri-
can goods and the second largest supplier of imports to the United
States, after Japan. 4 An agreement for a creation of a trilateral
FTA, composed of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, has
been signed and is currently being submitted to the legislature for
ratification in each of the countries' signatories. 75
69 U.S. Terminates Acceptance of LC.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BuLL.,
Jan. 1986, at 67-71. The United States terminated the 1946 Declaration with respect to
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court by filing the proper notice, dated October
7, 1985, which took effect April 7, 1985. Id.
70 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
7 Protocol of Provisional Application of the GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A2051, 55
U.N.T.S. 308.
71 See Romeu-Matta, New Developments in International Commercial Arbitration: A
Comparative Survey of New States Statues and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 Am. Rv.
INT'L ARB. 140 (1990); Susan Cohen, Note, International Commercial Arbitration: A Com-
parative Analysis of the United States System and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 12 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 703, 704, 727 (1986).
7' Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S.,
27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTA]; United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-449 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988)).
74 See S. REP. No. 509, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988) (United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement).
75 See also Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America
and the United Mexican States Concerning a Framework of ,Principles and Procedures for
Consultations Regarding Trade and Investment Relations, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 439
(1988); Dean C. Alexander, The North American Free Trade Area: Potential Framework
for an Agreement, 14 Hous. J. INT'L L. 85 (1991). Note that the similarity of the legal sys-
tems of the U.S. and Canada enabled the draftsmen of the Canada-U.S. FTA to create an
acceptable and smoothly functioning dispute resolution mechanism. This might not be the
case with Mexico, whose legal system and judicial traditions are very different from the
common law systems in the U.S. and Canada: This might pose an additional challenge for
the negotiators. See Joseph A. McKinney, Dispute Settlement Under the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, At any event, this Article does not make reference to the U.S.-
Canada-Mexico FTA, recognizing its as yet perilous existence.
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The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement ("Canada-
U.S. FTA") provides for a dispute settlement mechanism which in-
cludes a trade commission and an ad hoc binational panel of arbi-
trators." This mechanism is more fully developed and sophisti-
cated than the earlier U.S.-Israel FTA and therefore, is better
equipped to deal with the complexity of the issues and satisfy the
need for expediency and finality.7 The inclusion of such a mecha-
nism in the Canada-U.S. FTA is reflective of the United States'
willingness to use arbitration or similar binding dispute settlement
mechanisms to resolve international disputes.78
B. Israel
The Israeli arbitration law, enacted in 19 6 8,71 recognizes arbi-
tration clauses in commercial contracts as enforceable with respect
to the parties or their substitutes, and provides for the immediate
stay of any court proceedings in a matter that has contractually
been limited to arbitration. 0 Similarly, such a stay is provided
with respect to disputes involving contractual foreign parties,
where the contract is subject to an international treaty to which
Israel is a signatory.8 ' The State of Israel is considered by the Is-
raeli Arbitration Law to be the same as an individual, subject to
certain immunities provided by law for the State against certain
types of claims.82 Additionally, Israel is a signatory to the New
York Convention 3 and has enacted rules for the execution of the
7' See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, 27 I.L.M. 281.
" See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
78 For a general discussion of the Canada-U.S. FTA arbitration mechanism, see Azrieli,
supra note 12, at 425-33.
" Hok Haborerut (1968) ("Arbitration Law"), 535 S.H. (1968), at 184, reprinted in 1
DINIM 631, translated in 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IV Israel, at 1-17 (Ken-
neth A. Simmonds ed., 1992).
so Id. §§ 1-5. For cases discussing recognition of arbitration agreements under Israeli
Law, see C.A. 108/60, Zaks v. Mosari, P/D 14, 2252; C.A. 60/68, Binyan, Co. v. Hershkoviz,
P/D 23(2), 625; C.A. 658, 594/80, Eliav v. Hasneh, Co., P/D 36(3), 544 (court would not
interfere or review arbitrator's award in issues which were contractually submitted to arbi-
tration); C.A. 160/82, Berkoviz v. Kupat Taymulim, Ltd., P/D 38(2), 117 (arbitrator's award
may only be attacked in court on basis of lack of good faith treatment, fraud, unlawful
influence, or "an injury to the fundamentals of justice."); C.A. 304/86, B.S. 527/86, B.S.T.
Co. v. Kibutz Ifat, P/D 40(3), 22; C.F. (Tel Aviv) 1976/83, Gur v. Rozenberg & Co., Psakim
1987(1), 309.
Id. § 6.
82 Id. § 36.
83 See supra note 66 (discussing New York Convention).
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New York Convention. 4 Under those rules, a party, whether Is-
raeli or foreign, is able to obtain a court decree enforcing a foreign
arbitration award through a brief and simple proceeding.85 The
most representative of Israel's commitment to resolving interna-
tional disputes with other countries through arbitration is the
Taba arbitration, which was conducted under the Treaty of Peace
Between Egypt and Israel.8
6
IV. THE CASE FOR COMPARISON-THE FTA's FLAWED
ARBITRATION
A. General
Arbitration clauses are somewhat similar to prenuptial agree-
ments. They are drafted in the rosy dawn of a relationship, con-
sidered peripheral to other concerns, and then savagely attacked
or scavenged for weaponry when the relationship sours. Optimists
may blithely assume that the parties will be able to negotiate the
details of the arbitration process later, while those with a more
suspicious nature may attempt to examine all possible future con-
tingencies with exquisitely drawn procedures.8 7
The U.S.-Israel FTA is living proof of the above statement: its
dispute settlement mechanism is heavily lacking; it is based on the
assumption that a conciliatory and amicable atmosphere is certain
to govern any disagreement between the parties; it does not pro-
vide sufficient specificity in its procedural rules; and it does not
deal with fundamental problems bound to arise during the
proceeding.
The warm atmosphere surrounding the creation of the FTA
between Israel and the United States, which continued a long
friendship between the two countries, and almost unconditional
support of the young Jewish state by the United States, 8 has, in
the last two years, given way to a colder, more suspicious coopera-
" Takanot Lebizua Amanat New York (Borerut Huz) (1978), K.T. No. 3878 (1978), at
1894.
For a comprehensive survey of Israel's arbitration law, see S. OrrOLENGHi, BORERUT
DiN-VA-NOHAL (1991).
88 Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, Egypt-Isr., 18 I.L.M. 362 [hereinafter Treaty of
Peace]; see infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
:7 Garylee Cox, The Selection Process and the Appointment of Arbitrators, ARB. J.,
June 1991, at 28.
88 See Rosen, supra note 6, at 97-98.
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tion between the two nations.89 Government officials on both sides
suggested that "the longlasting relationship between the' United
States and Israel might be at an important turning point"' o and
also included accusations, on the Israeli side, of the United States
administration's "concerted leaks."9 1 The reason for the dramatic
deterioration, some say, is the fierce competition between both
countries' military industries over international markets.92 Defense
contracts account for a substantial part of the United States indus-
trial sector and enjoy tremendous influence on the administration's
foreign policy formulation process.9 3
The latest blow to United States-Israel relations has been
dealt by the "loan guarantees" issue. Based mainly on the assump-
tion that "antipathy to foreign aid is a more powerful election-year
force than the usual voter support for Israel," and that "[t]he fun-
damental principal of American foreign policy since 1945-the
containment of communism-makes no sense today, '9 4 the United
States administration boldly applied heavy pressure on Israel to
make concessions towards the Arab world as a condition to United
States loan guarantees.95 The imposition of what the Israeli gov-
ernment viewed as "impossible terms" that "no Government in
Israel could accept" led it to believe that "the relations between
the two countries will never be the same again."9 " Similar accusa-
tions that the United States is "trying to rearrange Israel's bor-
ders," and that "[t]he administration is trying to destroy Israel's
"' See Warren Strobel, Rabin at Odds with Lobby in U.S.: Blames AIPAC for Strained
Ties, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at Al.
90 Clyde Haberman, Israelis Step Up Skirmish With U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992,
at A3.
Id. It is widely perceived that the U.S. administration is dramatically changing its
favorable policy toward Israel. See, e.g., Leslie H. Gelb, The Anti-Israel Leaks, N.Y. Tirans,
Mar. 20, 1992, at A33; Israel Bristles as U.S. Team Probes Arms Trade, JEWISH WEEK, Mar.
27, 1992, at 3; A.M. Rosenthal, Evans-Novak & Popeye, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at A33;
Russell Watson et al., Bush Bashes Israel, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at 42-43.
92 See Caleb Baker, Middle East Arms Sales Replace U.K. As Key to U.S. Contractors'
Survival, DEFENSE NEws, Sept. 24, 1990, at 3; Philip Finnegan, Israeli Firms Aggressively
Try to Capture U.S. Market, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 9 / Nov. 15, 1992, at 1; Israeli Arms
Industry Fights for Survival, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 23, 1992.
11 See Ze'ev Schiff, U.S. Accusations On Arms Are Fundamentally Flawed, JEWISH
WEEK, Mar. 27 - Apr. 2, 1992, at 24; Moshe Zak, Israel Bashing: Good For Business, JEWISH
WEEK, March 27 - Apr.2, 1992, at 24.
9 Richard Lacayo, Boldness Without Vision, TIME, Mar. 9, 1992, at 24.
95 See id. at 24-25; see also J.F.O. McAllister, Israel Uncle Sam Closes His Wallet,
TI ME, Mar. 30, 1992, at 37.
" Clyde Haberman, Many Israelis See Loan Aide As Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992,
at All (quoting Israeli minister Moshe Arens).
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image in American public opinion '97 together amount to a showing
that the amicable, friendly and cooperative relationship between
the United States and Israel no longer exists.""
Viewing the U.S.-Israel FTA in this context creates substan-
tial concern with respect to its continuing success. It is fair to as-
sume that the political tensions between the two governments
would have a depressing effect on their trade dealings. Even if the
new government in Israel, or the new Clinton administration in
Washington, is able to bring the two countries together again and
restore some of the past amicable relationship, the 1991-1992
downfall reflects the inherent volatility of international coopera-
tion in the absence of solid arrangements that are rooted in
tightly-drafted agreements and equipped with efficient dispute res-
olution mechanisms.
The FTA's dispute settlement procedure, which has wide ju-
risdiction, 9 is substantially lacking. As the economically weaker
party to the FTA, a flawed dispute resolution mechanism could
leave Israel with no means of asserting its rights against the United
States or curing any other deprivation of benefits under the
Agreement. °00
The inadequacy of the dispute settlement mechanism under
the FTA is emphasized by the absence of any published procedural
rules, list of arbitrators, or any reported decisions of panels under
the Agreement.'0 ' There is no official record as to the parties' expe-
rience with resolving disputes under the FTA.'0 2
'7 Clyde Haberman, Shamir Is Accusing The U.S. Of Trying To Rearrange Israel'B
Border, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 24, 1992, at A10 (quoting Israel's Prime Minister Shamir).
98 See John Friedman, Damage To Bush Seen, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 19, 1992, at A12;
Clyde Haberman, Israel Considers Effect Of Rebuff By Bush On U.S. Loan Guarantees,
N.Y. T'uEs, Mar. 19, 1992, at A12.
o" See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
100 Similar inferiority fears led Canada to demand and achieve a much more detailed
dispute resolution mechanism under the Canada-U.S. FTA, so that disputes between the
two countries would be resolved through binding arbitration according to detailed proce-
dures by an independent and impartial panel. See Azrieli, supra note 12, at 420, 430; Sym-
posium, Alternative Dispute Resolution In Canada-U.S. Trade Relations, 40 MMAN L. REv.
223, 240-41 (1988) (presentation of Charles Colgan).
101 That is not the case with the Canada-U.S. FTA. Decisions under the Canada-U.S.
FTA are routinely published and are available on electronic data bases such as Lexis. See,
e.g., In re Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel No.
CDA-89-1807-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (1989).
102 See Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of International Trade, 137 F.R.D. 509 (1990) (noting no cases have been heard by
courts under U.S.-Israel FTA).
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Unofficial information indicates that only one case has been
submitted to a panel of arbitrators under the U.S.-Israel FTA.10 3 It
involved an Israel company, Sharnoa, which imported certain ma-
chine-tools from South Korea, processed and reproduced or reas-
sembled them in Israel, and then exported the final product into
the United States market. The dispute revolved around the ques-
tion of "origins" of the products, and the panel of arbitrators re-
solved the dispute in favor of Israel.' °4 Though the dispute has al-
ready spent more than two years in the FTA's dispute solution
mechanism, it has not yet been resolved, and a panel decision has
not yet been officially released. By conducting the process behind
closed doors and under a tight veil of secrecy, government officials
have kept the process within their complete control and have made
it impossible for the public or other interested parties to apply
pressure on the losing party to abide by the decision.10 5
The FTA indeed entitles its dispute resolution mechanism
"Dispute Settlement," and not "Arbitration.' ' 0 It also provides
for the Panel to issue a non-binding Report, and does not provide
for any enforcement procedure.10 7 The Sharnoa dispute reflects the
fact that the FTA offers practically no effective mechanism for
conclusively resolving a "real" dispute, that is, a dispute in which
the parties have a sincere and substantial disagreement, or even an
unfriendly controversy. It is safe to assume that the chilling politi-
10' See International Trade News Developments in Brief, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA),
JAN. 10, 1991.
104 See Arbitration Panel Says U.S. Violated Israel FTA in Attempt to Block Taiwan
Machine Tools, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), July 17, 1991; Evelyn Gordon, Talks Set to Iron
Out Bilateral Trade Issues, JERUSALEM POST, July 24, 1991 (stating case had been brought
to arbitration and Sharnoa won); Ziv Hellman, Israeli Firm Wins FTA Victory, JERUSALEM
POST, June 19, 1991 (stating that arbitration judges unanimously agreed with Israel); Judy
Maltz, U.S., Israel Discuss Duties, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, Sept. 9, 1991, at 4 (ruling held
U.S. in violation of FTA).
1I See U. Ginosar, Hayoram Mimisrad Hatamas, MAAIuV ASAKIM, Oct. 20, 1992, at 20.
The information regarding the Sharnoa dispute was collected through numerous discussions
with lawyers and officials involved in the process. As of yet, there are no publicly available
records of the proceedings or the disposition of that case. Despite the fact that the parties
proceeded through all stages of the dispute resolution mechanism under the FTA, including
the issuance of a final award by a panel of arbitrators according to articles 19(1)e and 19(2)
of the U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, 24 I.L.M. at 665, all such records are being kept hid-
den from the public eye.
100 U.S.-Israel FTA, art. 19, supra note 3, 24 I.L.M. at 664.
107 The FTA does provide, however, that the "affected Party" (presumably, the one
initiating the arbitration) "shall be entitled to take any appropriate measures." U.S.-Israel
FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(2), 24 I.L.M. at 665. This somewhat ambiguous language is dis-
cussed infra, notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
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cal atmosphere between the two governments will create additional
examples of the incompetency of the FTA's dispute resolution
mechanism.
A comparison between different international commercial ar-
bitration institutions and rules, both private commercial arbitra-
tion and arbitration between nations, shows that an arbitration
clause or a dispute resolution mechanism is usually detailed and
procedurally comprehensive, capable of providing a smooth and
successful resolution, free of dilatory procedural disagreements.
The fundamental assumption is that the parties' need to resort to
such procedure arises only after all conciliatory and amicable mea-
sures fail to resolve the dispute."0 8 This is true not only when the
arbitration clause is part of a peace treaty or an intergovernmental
agreement settling harsh hostilities between opposing nations, but
also in the context of friendly relationships that might turn sour
such as that of the United States and Israel. No harm is done by
laying down the details of the dispute settlement procedure and
trying to deal in advance with each of the elements of the arbitra-
tion process.
Additionally, the lack of detailed procedure constitutes a defi-
nite risk to the essential element of expediency.
The form of arbitration proceedings depends essentially upon the
agreement of the parties.... This is one of the reasons why ad
hoc arbitration proceedings, especially before party-appointed ar-
bitrators, are often delayed, since the arbitrators do not have the
benefit of recourse to arbitration rules to which they may refer in
the case of disagreement.109
The risk that negotiating the details of a dispute resolution
mechanism in advance, by itself, would cause friction and suspi-
cion, or create an adversarial atmosphere, is arguably absent in the
context of international negotiations. Such fears do exist in the
context of private sector contractual negotiations, especially those
of a more personal character such as prenuptial agreements. In
such cases, individuals negotiating personal interests might per-
ceive lengthy discussions of dispute resolution mechanisms as
preparations for a battle and as an indication of hostile intentions.
Much can be gained by planning in advance for all potential
108 See generally ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Peter Sarceic
ed., 1989).
109 DOMKE, supra note 63, § 24:01, at 362.
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disagreements with respect to the composition of the panel, its
procedure, and the remedies it may award. As discussed below, the
dispute resolution mechanism under the FTA is substantially lack-
ing when compared to similar institutions and their sets of rules.
The list of institutions and sets of arbitration rules chosen for
comparison in this Article is not exhaustive; however, in order to
present a comprehensive analysis, a representative group of exam-
ples was chosen. 110
B. Institutions for Comparison
1. The Canada-U.S. FTA
Naturally, the first and the most relevant institution for com-
parison is the 1988 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and
the United States.1 It was signed three years after the U.S.-Israel
FTA, and offers a much more detailed dispute resolution mecha-
nism. 112 The comparison below is limited to the general dispute
resolution mechanism under Chapter 18, entitled "Institutional
Provisions," which provides the means for resolving any dispute
under the Canada-U.S. FTA, excluding disputes with respect to
anti-dumping, countervailing duties, or financial services, which
are dealt with under Chapter 19.113
A recent study showed that panels of arbitrators have been
utilized in only two of the first eight Chapter 18 cases filed.114 The
study points out that only those cases that were the most politi-
110 The draftsmen of the U.N. Charter, though determined to abolish "the scourge of
war," failed to develop a U.N. sponsored "mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes
(making self-help unnecessary and undesirable)." HENKIN, supra note 2, at 138. The absence
of such an institution of ultimate jurisdiction makes it necessary to develop and maintain a
separate dispute resolution system under each and every international agreement. Some
may argue, however, that the essence of international arbitration is the fact that the disput-
ing nations submit themselves voluntarily to a mutually created ad-hoc institution, and
thus there is no place for mandatory or compulsory jurisdiction.
"I Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73. The 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement,
which expands the Canada-U.S. FTA to include Mexico as well, is not used here for compar-
ison since (1) it has not yet been implemented by the Congress, or by the Mexican legisla-
ture, and (2) the election of a democratic administration is likely to bring about substantial
revisions to that agreement. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact May Have to Wait, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1992, at Dl.
12 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, ch. 18-19, 27 I.L.M. at 383-95.
11 Id. at 386-95
14 McKinney, supra note 75, at 94.
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cally charged were referred to binding arbitration,11 5 which pro-
vided an expedient procedure ending lengthy and fruitless negotia-
tions. The study further stated that, viewing Chapter 18 and
Chapter 19 disputes together, experience shows that such disputes
are' "being settled quickly, and most of the time by the unanimous
decisions of binational panels. Canadian-majority panels have
ruled against Canadian complaints and U.S.-majority panels have
ruled against U.S. administrative agencies. The system is widely
perceived to be fair and effective . .. .",0
Pursuant to the Canada-U.S. FTA, the parties have created a
Code of Conduct for panelists employed in Chapter 18 and Chap-
ter 19 proceedings, 1 aimed at achieving integrity and impartiality
of the panel members.1 8
In an interesting "twist" that brings the chilling U.S.-Israel re-
lations to mind, Canada's ambassador to the United States re-
cently accused the United States of "playing foul in its reading of
the United States-Canada FTA," and of taking actions in violation
of that agreement. The ambassador noted that Canada had fore-
gone a "fair weather" trade agreement, one that may be rescinded
in times of economic hardship, in favor of the FTA, which ensures
continuous access to the United States market. "Canada," he
stressed, "will vigorously pursue its rights, including full dispute
resolution under the free trade agreement."'19 That statement re-
flected Canada's reliance on the agreement's effective dispute reso-
lution mechanism in dealing with disputes which have not been
resolved amicably.
Even though the Canada-U.S. FTA is three years younger
than the U.S.-Israel FTA, dispute resolution experience under that
agreement is much richer, and the process is significantly more
open and public. Panel decisions under the Canada-U.S. FTA are
routinely published and are available on electronic databases.1 2 0 As
discussed below, experience under the Israel-U.S. FTA is very dif-
111 Id.
11 Id. at 97.
117 Code of Conduct for Proceedings Under Chapters 18 and 19 of the United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 54 Fed. Reg. 14371, 14371-72 (1989).
118 Id. (preamble). For a general discussion of the Code of Conduct under the Canada-
U.S. FTA, see Azrieli, supra note 12, at 428-29.
'11 John Turro, Canadian Ambassador Cries Foul over U.S. Free Trade Accord Ac-
tions, TAx NoTEs INT'L, Apr. 6, 1992, at 15-17, available in LEXIS, Fedtax library,
TXNINT file (quoting Arab. Derek H. Burney).
110 See supra note 101.
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ferent. No procedural rules or code of conduct for panelists have
been created by the parties, no information is officially available
concerning the parties' experiences with the dispute resolution
mechanism, and no records of panel decisions have been
published.121
2. Israel-Egypt Treaty of Peace
The second arbitration institution for comparison is the one
under the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, 122 signed in
1979, together with the later 1987 agreement to arbitrate the
boundary dispute concerning the Taba Beachfront which was en-
tered into in accordance with the peace treaty.
By its nature, a peace treaty of that type has a relatively short
term of implementation, focusing mainly on border-line corrections
and the constitution of normal diplomatic relations. As a result, it
does not require the creation of a detailed arbitration mechanism,
but instead avails the parties of the usual dispute resolution fo-
rums which serve countries when a political dispute occurs. As dis-
cussed above, it is hoped that future Middle-East peace agree-
ments would not only settle the national animosities, but also
create comprehensive economic arrangements on a long-term basis,
creating a "Middle-East Economic Community" similar to the EC.
The arbitration under the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace, in
view of its narrow scope, has limited application to the discussion
here. That arbitration dealt with a boundary dispute between the
parties regarding the location of fourteen border demarcation pil-
lars in the Sinai peninsula. The parties agreed in 1986 to arbitrate
the dispute and formed a five-member Tribunal (the "Tribunal")
for that purpose. 12
3
The submission of the Taba dispute to binding arbitration was
done in accordance with a procedure provided for by the 1979
Treaty of Peace. 2 4 The Treaty created a "Joint Commission" for
the purpose of locating hundreds of demarcation pillars along the
boundary line between the countries and for arbitration in case the
121 See infra notes 348-86 and accompanying text. (discussing possible reasons for man-
agement style of U.S.-Israel FTA and analyzing unofficially-available data).
122 See Treaty of Peace, supra note 86.
122 Agreement to Arbitrate the Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Beachfront,
Sept. 11, 1986, Egypt-Isr., 26 I.L.M. 1, 1987 [hereinafter Taba Beach Front Agreement].
124 Id.
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Commission failed to agree.1 25 The Treaty of Peace required Israel
and Egypt to deal with "dispute[s] arising out of the application or
interpretation" of the treaty's provisions through settlement nego-
tiations and, if unsuccessful, through conciliation or submission to
arbitration.'26 The Taba boundary dispute was first negotiated by
the parties, with assistance from the United States, but failed to be
resolved. An agreement between the parties to arbitrate the dis-
pute followed, and the Tribunal eventually accepted Egypt's posi-
tion. 117 Following the award, the parties negotiated and concluded
the details of the implementation process, and, on March 15, 1989,
Israel surrendered sovereignty over the Taba area to Egypt, includ-
ing resort facilities located in that area.12 The peaceful conclusion
of the Taba affair, through successful binding arbitration of the
boundary dispute and the full implementation of the arbitrator's
award, reflects Israel's commitment to peaceful resolution of inter-
national disputes through arbitration. The details of the dispute
resolution process under the peace treaty with Egypt is most useful
for comparison with the mechanism provided by the FTA.'29
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties
The Model Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") and sample
provisions from negotiated BITs are used here as a most relevant
example for comparison.130 BITs are agreements by which the
United States and numerous counterparts, on a reciprocal basis,
jointly define the rights of individual investors with respect to
their investments in the other contracting country.131 A BIT typi-
cally covers general principles for the treatment of foreign inves-
tors, the conditions of expropriation and the measure of compensa-
tion payable, the right to free transfer without delay of profits and
122 See Treaty of Peace, supra note 86, art. IV, VII, 18 I.L.M. at 364, 366.
126 Id. art. VII, 18 LL.M. at 366.
17 Egypt-Israel Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the
Taba Area, 27 I.L.M. 1421, 1492 (1988).
M20 Agreements Regarding the Permanent Boundary Between Egypt and Israel and
Tourism in South Sinai, Feb. 26, 1989, Egypt-Isr., 28 I.L.M. 611. See id. (parties concluded
agreement that set forth specifics of arrangement with respect to tourism and transfer of
resort ownership); see also INT'L ARs. REP., Mar. 1989, at 8.
2 For a general discussion of the Tribunal's decision, see Peter D. Trooboff, Arbitral
Decision, 82 At.. J. INT'L L. 590 (1989).
120 See Robert C. O'Sullivan, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Sample
Provisions from Negotiated BITs, in 1 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 649,
649 (1990).
131 Id.
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other funds associated with investments, and the access to interna-
tional arbitration for settlement. of investment disputes. 132 The
United States has signed BITs with numerous countries, such as
Bangladesh,3 3  Cameroon,"" Egypt,"3 5  Grenada, 3 6 Haiti,137  Mo-
rocco,138 Panama,139 Senegal,140 Turkey, 4 ' and Zaire. 42 A BIT usu-
ally provides that investors have the right to prompt review by the
appropriate domestic judicial or administrative authority in the
host country'43 and also provides for submission of any investment
disputes to a binding international arbitration'" or to the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. 45 This is
all in addition to the investors' right to rely upon any contractually
provided dispute resolution procedure and the usual judicial reme-
132 Id. at 650.
"' Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Mar. 12, 1986, U.S.-Bangl., S. TREATY Doc. No. 23, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
114 Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Feb. 26, 1986, U.S.-Cameroon, S. TREATY Doc. No. 22, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
1M0 Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, S. TREATY Doc. No. 13, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), 21 I.L.M.
927, 1982; Supplementary Protocol, Mar. 11, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
May 2, 1986, U.S.-Gren., S. TREATY Doc. No. 25, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
"" Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Dec. 13, 1983, U.S.-Haiti, S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (transmitted
to Senate for Advise and Consent, Mar. 25, 1986). But see Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by
BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Invest-
ment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW 655, 658 (deferred consideration of BITS with
Haiti for political reasons as of fall 1990).
1"8 Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
July 22, 1985, U.S.-Morocco, S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
I9 Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Oct
27, 1982, Mar. 25, 1986, U.S.-Pan., S. TREATY Doc. No. 14, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
(transmitted to Senate for Advice and Consent Mar. 25, 1986), 21 I.L.M. 1227 (1982). But
see Salacuse, supra note 137, at 658 (deferred consideration of BIT with Panama for politi-
cal reasons as of Fall 1990).
140 Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Dec. 6, 1983, U.S.-Senegal, S. TREATY Doc. No. 15, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
14l Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Dec. 3, 1985, U.S.-Turk., S. TREATY Doc. No. 19, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
"I Treaty concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
Aug. 3, 1984, U.S.-Zaire, S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also
Salacuse, supra note 137, at 658 (discussing U.S. BITs).
141 See Robert C.'O'Sullivan, Model OPIC Investment Incentive Agreement, art. III,
reprinted in 1 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 665 (1990) [hereinafter Model
BIT].
114 Id. art. VI.
145 Id.
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dies applicable to the specific dispute.146
The Model BIT is most relevant for comparison. First, a
strong similarity exists between the BIT and the FTA. An FTA is
intended to eliminate barriers blocking the access of industrial en-
tities from one country into the other country's market. Similarly,
a BIT is intended to protect one country's investing entities in
their activity within the other contracting state. Second, the Model
BIT and those BITs which were signed by the United States with
the countries mentioned above constitute a good example for the
inclusion of a detailed arbitration mechanism in an international
agreement between contracting states with major cultural, reli-
gious, racial, political, and economical differences.147
4. The ICSID
Closely related to the BITs is the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), which is run by and is
located at the headquarters of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development ("World Bank") in Washington, D.C.
The ICSID was established under the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States ("ICSID Convention"),14 s which offers an alternative
to foreign investors who do not wish to litigate in the host coun-
try's domestic judicial system. It has been ratified by numerous
states in Asia, Africa, Europe, and North and South America. As of
March 4, 1991, 100 states had signed the ICSID Convention, with
92 of the signatory states having ratified it.149
The ICSID Convention is highly instructive for the very same
reasons mentioned above with respect to BITs. Its arbitration rules
have been accepted by a large number of countries, both develop-
146 See O'Sullivan, supra note 130, at 651, n. 9 and accompanying text (BIT with Haiti
provides for arbitration under International Chambers of Commerce auspices).
'47 See Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination
of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1 (1983); Kathleen Kunzer, Recent Development, Developing a Model Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1983); Marian N. Leich, International
Economic Law-Bilateral Investment Treaties, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 947 (1986).
"8 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, reprinted in 4
I.L.M. 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
149 See Introduction and Bibliography to ICSID Convention, in 1991 Additional Docu-
ments of Int'l Economic L. (Am. Soc'y Int'l L.) 32, available in LEXIS, 1991 B.D.I.E.L.-
A.D. Lexis 32.
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ing and developed countries, democratic and undemocratic. It
should be noted, however, that the ICSID Convention provides for
arbitration only with respect to disputes between a state and indi-
vidual foreign investors, whereas disputes between states are re-
ferred to the International Court of Justice by the application of
any party to such disputes1 50 or, at the option of a party, to any
other method of settlement.151 Since the International Court of
Justice has come to be viewed in the last few decades as a tribunal
specialized in the demarcation of disputed boundaries,'52 its com-
pulsory jurisdiction has been terminated totally by the United
States.153 Since most countries "have not been prepared to submit
to its jurisdiction or even to invoke it when the other side had ac-
cepted jurisdiction,' ' 54 it is fair to assume that disputing states will
avoid referring to the International Court of Justice and will
choose to adjudicate under the procedure provided by the ICSID
Convention.'55
5. UNCITRAL
Another source for comparison is the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration ("UNCITRAL Model Law"),'156 and the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 57 which are aimed at promoting
uniformity of laws applicable to international trade. 58 The United
Nations General Assembly's resolution on the UNCITRAL Model
Law states that "all states give due consideration to the Model
Law... in view of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbi-
150 ICSID Convention, supra note 148, ch. VIII, 4 I.L.M. at 543.
1's Id.
12 Morrison, supra note 67, at 830; see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
IS HENKIN, supra note 2, at 186. Even though Professor Henkin details the reasons for
such reluctance, he does make the observation that most of them are "irrational" and states
that "[the Western observer is committed to hopes that adjudication may yet play ai greater
role." Id. at 187-88.
"I See Morrison, supra note 67, at 827 n. 34.
66 U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 81, U.N. Doc. No. A/40/17 (1985),
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1302 (1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
157 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. No. A/
31/17, U.N. Sales No. E.77.V.6 (1976), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 702 (1976) [hereinafter UNCI-
TRAL Rules].
'18 In addition to the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, the U.N. Commission also
issued the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. 11 UNCITRAL Y.B. 97, U.N. Sales No. E.81.V.8
(1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 300 (1981).
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tral procedures and the specific needs of international commercial
arbitration practice." 159 The drafters of the UNCITRAL Model
Law believed that the availability of a uniform, UN-prepared set
of rules for international commercial arbitration would make it
easier for disputing parties to agree on the location of the arbitra-
tion, and prevent failure of the agreement to arbitrate due to diffi-
culties in choosing a location. "Such uniformity would instill confi-,
dence in an international system that promotes all aspects of the
arbitral process."160
Though the UNCITRAL Model Law does not expressly pre-
clude its application to intergovernmental disputes, as distin-
guished from private cross-border commercial arbitrations, it lim-
its its scope to "international commercial arbitration."'6 1 The
drafters made it clear that their intention was to create a model
law for use in arbitration between individual parties and not be-
tween governments. 6 2 On the other hand, the essence of the UN-
CITRAL Model Law is its application to "international" disputes,
in which the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time
of the conclusion of that agreement, their places of business in dif-
ferent states, or in which the place of arbitration, the place of per-
formance of a substantial part of the obligations under the agree-
ment, or the subject matter of the business agreement is to be
conducted or is located outside the state in which the parties have
their places of business.'6 3 Based on the assumption that the ulti-
mate beneficiaries under FTA agreements are private-sector enti-
ties and individuals engaged in trade and business activities with
their private-sector counterparts in the other contracting state, the
fundamentals of the UNCITRAL Model Law are the rules most
applicable to an arbitration under an FTA Agreement. Support for
this argument is found in the fact that the UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules frequently provide a procedural framework for intergov-
ernmental arbitration, and the fact that these rules were originally
created by adopting either intact or almost verbatim portions of
the rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commis-
159 G.A. Res. 72, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 112th plen. mtg. (1985).
160 Ronald A. Brand, UNCITRAL Model Law International Commercial Arbitration,
2 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 993 (1991).
1 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 1.
162 Id. art. 1, n.2 (defining term "commercial" in way that makes it clear that term
refers to private-sector business dealings).
163 Id. art. 1(3).
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sion, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the Centre for Com-
mercial Arbitration at Cairo, the Centre for Arbitration at Kuala
Lumpur, the Spanish Court of Arbitration, and other institu-
tions164 encompassing both private-sector and intergovernmental
arbitration.
6. International Chambers of Commerce
The International Chambers of Commerce ("ICC") is probably
the most popular and respected international commercial arbitra-
tion institution in the world. Founded in 1919, the ICC has its
headquarters in Paris and operates numerous branch offices or
subsidiaries in other countries around the world. The ICC has been
and still is a pioneer in the development of international arbitra-
tion, and its Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration (ICC Rules)16 5
are widely used. The ICC also played an important role in the cre-
ation of fundamental international arbitration documents such as
the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, the 1927 Geneva
Convention on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.' 6 The ICC Rules were ratified at the
ICC Congress in Rome in 1923 and were last amended in January
1988.167
The ICC Rules were created to serve as institutional rules to
be used by ICC panels in arbitration proceedings conducted under
the auspices of the ICC. The ICC Rules differ from the UNCI-
TRAL Rules, which were created for use in ad hoc arbitrations.
The ICC Rules are more comprehensive; in addition to procedure,
they provide for administrative matters such as hearing rooms,
translators, and secretarial services. The ICC is led by a formal
"Court of Arbitration," which is the supervising institution in
charge of all ICC arbitrations, and which resolves panel composi-
tion disputes,'68 deals with challenges to arbitrators6 9 as well as
164 See Ronald A. Brand, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in 2 Basic Documents of Int'l
Economic L. (CCH) 1015 (1991).
185 International Chambers of Commerce, Pub. No. 447, Rules of Conciliation and Ar-
bitration (1988), reprinted in 2 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 1041 (1990)
[hereinafter ICC Rules].
"I Ronald A. Brand, International Chambers of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration, 2 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 1037, 1037 (1991).
167 Id. "
188 ICC Rules, supra note 165, art. 2.
100 Id. art. 2(8).
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any other administrative issues such as costs, 17 0 arbitrators' fees,
and expenses.' 7 ' The ICC Court of Arbitration is in charge of scru-
tinizing the form of every ICC arbitration award and suggesting
substantive changes.' 72 Though sometimes criticized as excessively
costly,17 3 ICC arbitration is perceived as a well-established institu-
tion, offering most of the advantages of a well-run court system in
which parties know in advance the course of proceedings and enjoy
the benefits of well-tested rules and procedures for resolving dis-
putes.' 74 As with the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, the ICC
is an institution whose existence and activity mainly concern pri-
vate international jurisprudence. Its rules and procedures have,
however, been widely utilized for intergovernmental dispute reso-
lution as well 7 5 and are therefore relevant to the discussion below.
7. American Arbitration Association
The American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), founded in
1926, supervises more cases than any other arbitration institution
in the world, and has experienced increased involvement in inter-
national commercial disputes. 76 In addition to its "Commercial
Arbitration Rules" ("AAA Rules"), 77 the AAA has established
Supplementary Procedures for International Commercial Arbitra-
tion17 and a set of International Arbitration Rules. 17 9 Similar to
17I Id. art. 9(1).
171 Id. art. 20.
172 Id. art. 21.
"I See Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in
the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685,
1722 (1983) (alleging that amounts charged by ICC sometimes exceed value of services
provided).
174 See W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION
§ 3.02, at 41 (1991). Although the ICC did experience difficulty with its administrative effi-
ciency, it has succeeded in improving its efficiency and responsiveness. Id. See generally
Stevenson, An Introduction to ICC Arbitration, 14 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 3/81 (1980).
175 See Brand, supra note 166; CRAIG ET AL., supra note 174, §§ 36.01-.04.
171 See Ronald A. Brand, Introduction to American Arbitration Association Commer-
cial Arbitration Rules and Supplementary Procedures for International Commercial Arbi-
tration, in 2 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 1061 (1991); see also Carolyn M.
Penna, Caseload Trends: A Statistical View, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1992, at 37 (over past five
years AAA has become active in international arena, experiencing increase of over 150% in
cases supervised).
177 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, PuB. No. AAA-20M-1/88, COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION RULES (1988), reprinted in 2 Basic Documents of Int'l Economic L. (CCH) 1065
(1991) [hereinafter AAA RULES].
178 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, PuB. No. AAA-124-4M-2/86, SUPPLEMENTARY
PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1986), reprinted in 2 Basic Doc-
19931
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the ICC, the AAA is not merely a set of rules, but rather an insti-
tutional forum for arbitration proceedings. At the request of the
parties, the AAA will supervise arbitration under the UNCITRAL
Rules.' It also "serves as the United States National Section for
arbitration under the rules of the Inter-American Commercial Ar-
bitration Commission ['IACAC']."' s 1 The AAA involvement in in-
ternational arbitration has been emphasized by its role in the es-
tablishment of the World Arbitration Institute in New York, an
organization devoted to promoting the use of arbitration in resolv-
ing international disputes and attracting such international activ-
ity to the City of New York."82
V. ARBITRATION UNDER THE FTA-ANALYSIS
The following discussion commences with a descriptive sum-
mary of the dispute settlement mechanism provided for by the
FTA, followed by an analysis of its advantages and disadvantages.
The analysis is broken into several headings; reference and com-
parison are made to the institutions, the other sets of rules of in-
ternational arbitration previously discussed, and the respective ar-
bitration laws of the United States and Israel.
A. Preliminaries
The dispute settlement mechanism under the FTA has general
jurisdiction to deal with almost any dispute between the parties,
including disputes concerning: the interpretation of the FTA; fail-
ure of a party to carry out its obligations under the FTA; measures
taken by one party which are considered by the other party to be a
violation of the FTA, a distortion of the balance of trade benefits
accorded by the FTA, or an action undermining the FTA's funda-
uments of Int'l Economic L. 1065 (1991) [hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES].
The AAA has also created specialized arbitration rules for construction industry, fats and
oils, grain, patent, real-estate valuation, spice trade, and textile and apparel industry arbi-
tration. See Brand, supra note 176, at 1061:
179 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (1991), re-
printed in 1991 Additional Documents of'Int'l Economic L. (Am. Soc'y Int'l L.) 46, availa-
ble in LEXIS, 1991 B.D.I.E.L.-A.D. Lexis 46.
180 See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 178 (AAA appoints arbitrators
and handles cases governed by UNCITRAL Rules).
1"1 LUDWIK Kos-RABCEWICZ-ZIBKOWSKI & PAUL J. DAVIDSON, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATOR
INSTITUTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY AND GUIDE 7-8 (1986).
182 Brand, supra note 176, at 1061.
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mental objectives;""3 and importation of a product by one party in
quantities sufficient to cause a substantial, serious injury or threat
to domestic producers of that product or competitive products.' 4
The dispute settlement mechanism does not apply to the unilateral
imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties by one
party.185
The dispute settlement mechanism offers standing and reme-
dies only to the parties themselves, namely, the governments of
Israel and the United States. 88 Thus, despite the fact that by its
nature the FTA is aimed at benefiting private sector entities in-
volved in exporting and importing goods, manufacturers and retail-
ers alike, the FTA does not directly extend any rights to such
entities.8s
The chronology of the FTA's dispute settlement mechanism
begins with Consultations.'8 8 The procedure for Consultations is
not specified by the FTA. It is fair to assume, however, that the
FTA intends trade officials in both governments to keep open
channels of communication through which any such issue may be
raised. The provision for Consultations reflects the parties' inten-
tion to attempt to achieve a mutually agreeable resolution of any
dispute by way of settlement before proceeding to a more formal
and adversarial arbitral forum. Failure to resolve the dispute
through Consultations entitles either party to refer the matter to
the Joint Committee.189
The Joint Committee is the forum in charge of supervising the
implementation of the FTA. It is authorized to review continu-
183 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19, § 1(a), 24 I.L.M. at 664-65.
1- Id. art. 5 § 1, 24 I.L.M. at 658.
185 Id. art. 19, § 1(a), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
"' See id. arts. 1, 19, 24 LL.M. at 657, 664-65. Article 19 provides for the dispute settle-
ment mechanism and makes reference throughout only to "a Party" or "the Parties." Id.
art. 19, 24 I.L.M. at 664-65. The Parties are expressly noted as "[t]he governments of the
United States of America and Israel." Id. art. 1, 24 I.L.M. at 657; see also United States-
Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47, § 5(d), 99 Stat.
82,84 (1985) (providing that FTA does not create "any private right of action or remedy"
unless otherwise expressly established).
18 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, preamble & arts. 1, 19, 24 I.L.M. at 657, 664-65;
see also United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
47, § 5, 99 Stat. 82, 83-84 (1985); infra notes 416-26 and accompanying text (discussing
access of private-sector entities to FTA dispute settlement mechanism and possible avenues
for obtaining remedies by private sector entities).
' U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19 § (1)(b), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
189 Id. art. 19, § 1(c), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
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ously the trade relationship between the Parties;19 0 its role is to
offer the parties a more formal forum for discussions in their effort
to resolve amicably any dispute which they failed to resolve
through Consultations. 91 The Joint Committee is also authorized
to review continuously the results and impact of the FTA, and to
adopt amendments to the Agreement.'92 The Agreement further
provides that "[tihe Joint Committee shall be composed of repre-
sentatives of the Parties," headed "by the United States Trade
Representative and Israel Minister of Industry and Trade, or their
designees."' 9 It shall convene at least once a year in Israel and in
the United States alternately' and may establish and delegate its
powers to working groups. 95 The Joint Committee is also author-
ized to "establish its own rules of procedure," but has never pub-
lished such rules. 90 In summary, the Joint Committee is in charge
of the on-going administration of the agreement, with wide author-
ity to resolve any problems, whether minor or structural. 97
Failure of the Joint Committee to resolve the dispute within
sixty days after referral to the Committee (or a longer period as
the Joint Committee has agreed upon) entitles either party to refer
the dispute to a "Conciliation panel" (the "Panel"). 9 '
B. Initiating the Process
As described above, the FTA provides that, once the Joint
Committee fails to resolve the dispute, "either Party may refer the
matter to a Conciliation panel."' 99 Oddly enough, at that point no
panel actually exists, and, therefore, there is no panel to which a
dispute may be referred. The Agreement does not provide for no-
1 0 Id. art. 17, § 1, 24 I.L.M. at 663-64.
191 Id. art. 17, § 2(b), 24 I.L.M. at 663.
12 Id. art. 17, § 2(c), 24 I.L.M. at 663-64. Any amendment is subject, of course, to the
domestic legislative requirements in either country. Id.
... Id. art. 17, § 3(a), 24 I.L.M. at 664.
194 Id. art. 17, § 4.
191 Id. art. 17, § (3)(b).
19. Id. art. 17, § 4. A similar provision exists in the Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73,
art. 1802, § 5, 27 I.L.M. 381, 384 (requiring Commission decisions to be made by consensus).
197 Such a permanent administrative forum is a popular vehicle in similar international
agreements. The Canada-U.S. FTA, for example, created a "Trade Commission," which also
enjoys quasi-judicial powers to resolve disputes between the parties. See Canada-U.S. FTA,
supra note 73, art. 1802, 27 I.L.M. at 384; see also Treaty of Peace, supra note 86, art. IV,
§ 3, 18 I.L.M. 362, 364.
198 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19, § 1(d), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
199 Id.
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tice of arbitration or any other procedure by which the process
may be initiated; it only provides that the process of panelists' ap-
pointments shall begin within fifteen days of "such referral" to a
not yet existing panel.200 On the other hand, the FTA is clear in
granting either party an unconditional right to unilaterally refer
the matter to "a Conciliation panel" and does not give the Joint
Committee a role in the referral of the dispute nor require its ap-
proval for the creation of such panel.
The initiation of arbitration proceedings can be done in sev-
eral different ways. Pursuant to the Canada-U.S. FTA, 0 1 the Joint
Commission is authorized to refer unresolved disputes to "binding
arbitration. '"202 It should be noted, however, that the Commission
under the Canada-U.S. FTA may reach decisions only by consen-
sus.203 That requirement is absent from the U.S.-Israel FTA and is
most undesirable since a party who is not completely confident in
its chances of winning an arbitration is able to prevent referral of
the dispute to a panel.20 4
A somewhat similar method is employed by the ICSID Con-
vention, 05 which, in the absence of an underlying agreement to
submit every dispute to arbitration, limits its jurisdiction to cases
in which "the parties to the [specific] dispute consent in writing to
submit to the Centre."20 6 However, once consent is given and the
Center assumes jurisdiction, "no party may withdraw its consent
unilaterally. "207
The ICC rules provide for an initiation method which is more
comparable to court procedure. It requires a party wishing to initi-
ate arbitration to "submit its Request for Arbitration to the Secre-
tariat of the [ICC] Court." 0 8 That Request should include each
Party's name, description, and address, and a full statement of the
claimant's case, along with any relevant agreements and docu-
ments. 209 The Secretariat of the ICC Court then sends a copy of
200 Id.
201 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73.
202 Id. art. 1806, § 1(b), 27 LL.M. at 384-85.
20 Id. art. 1802, § 5, 27 I.L.M. at 384.
204 See Azrieli, supra note 12, at 426 (discussing "veto option").
201 ICSID Convention, supra note 148, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 4 I.L.M. 532.
206 Id. art. 25, § 1, 17 U.S.T. at 1280, 4 I.L.M. at 536.
207 Id.
20s See ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 3, § 1.
209 Id. art. 3, § 2.
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the Request to the defendant. 210 The defendant then has 30 days
to respond by filing an answer with the Secretariat, with or with-
out a counterclaim.211 That procedure is inadequate in the absence
of a continuously existing court, such as the ICC court.
The Model BIT is similar to the FTA in that, at the time a
party decides to resort to a panel of arbitrators, no such panel is
yet in existence; however, it offers a simpler initiation method,
under which a party may submit a Request to the other party for
the establishment of an arbitrator tribunal for a binding deci-
sion.21 2 The receipt of such a Request marks the "initiation date"
from which each party has two months to appoint an arbitrator.1 3
Another example of the initiation of proceedings in intergovern-
mental disputes is offered under the Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration, which provides for a
party initiating recourse to ,arbitration to "give to the other
party . ..a Notice of arbitration," following which the composi-
tion of the arbitral tribunal shall commence. 4
A method of requiring the initiating party to give the other
party a "Notice" or a "Request" of its intention to initiate arbitra-
tion is also provided for by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
which require that such Notice includes all information with re-
spect to the parties, nature of the claim, relief or remedy sought,
and certain other procedural requirements.2 15 An almost identical
method is provided for by the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules,
which call the initiating party's papers the "Demand. 21 6
Comparing these different methods of initiating arbitral pro-
ceedings, in the context of the FTA's intergovernmental dispute
resolution role, and in the absence of a permanent arbitration fo-
rum such as the ICC Court, the preferred method should be for
one party to initiate the process by giving the other party a Notice/
210 Id. art. 3, § 3.
21 Id. arts. 4-5. If a counterclaim is filed, the claimant may file a reply within 30 days.
Id. art. 5, § 2.
212 Model BIT, supra note 143, art. VII, § 1.
213 Id. art. VII, § 2.
214 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, (IACICA),
Jan. 30, 1975, art. V, § 1 (b) 14 I.L.M. 336, 337 see RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION art. 3 (1982), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Doc. 11.8 [hereinafter IACAC RULES].
"2 UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 157.
210 AAA RULES, supra note 177, art. 2; see also IACAC RULES, supra note 214, art. 3
§§ 1, 3.
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Request/Demand for the empaneling of arbitrators for the specific
dispute. It is advisable to modify the FTA so it provides for this
initiation Notice to include, in addition to technical information, a
short description of the subject matter of the dispute and the rem-
edies which the party intends to claim.
Even in the absence of a formal modification of the FTA by
the parties, this draftsmen's lapse may be overlooked, and, in view
of the similarity between the methods offered by other institutions,
it is assumed that the FTA intends that either party may notify
the other of its intent to refer the matter to a Panel, and promptly
thereafter may proceed to select its Panel members; however, the
Agreement should be clarified accordingly.217
C. Composition of the Panel
The FTA provides that the Panel shall be composed of three
members, two of whom are appointed, one by each party, and a
third who shall serve as Chairman, appointed by the two
Panelists.218
1. Time
The process of the Panelists' selection is to be completed
within forty-five days from the date of referral.219 As discussed
above, the exact date of referral is difficult to determine.22 How-
ever, under a reasonable interpretation, the time period should be-
gin on the date when one party notifies the other of its intent to
refer the matter to a Panel.
2. Selecting Panelists
The FTA is silent as to the Panelists' qualifications, expertise,
character, independence, or nationality. It does not set any guide-
lines for the parties in the performance of their duty to select the
Panelists.
2'7 For example, clarity can be improved by adding language similar to that of the UN-
CITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 21, which provides: "Unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date
on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respon-
dent." Id.
2 1 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19, § 1(d), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
219 Id.
220 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
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The Canada-U.S. FTA, for example, requires its Commission
to develop and maintain a roster of potential panelists, though the
parties are not obligated to appoint solely out of that roster.22' The
Canada-U.S. FTA requires that "panelists shall be chosen strictly
on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment, and,
where appropriate, have expertise in the particular matter under
consideration. ' 222 It further provides that the "Panelists shall not
be affiliated with or take instructions from either Party. ' 2   The
governments of Canada and the United States have also agreed on
a Code of Conduct for the panelists, which forbids even the ap-
pearance of partiality or party influence on the part of a panel-
ists. 224 None of the above procedures and protections exist under
the U.S.-Israel FTA.
These other arbitral institutions require high moral character,
impartiality, recognized competence in the subject matter of the
dispute, and independent judgment from all panelists, including
party-appointed panelists.2 2 Though the requirements are set with
various degrees of strictness, the U.S.-Israel FTA is the sole exam-
ple in which such requirements are completely absent with respect
to any of the panelists.
The question of "appearance" of partiality in favor of, or de-
pendence on, one party arises also in the context of the nationality
221 See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 72, art. 1807, § 1, 27 I.L.M. at 385; see also
Azrieli, supra note 12, at 427-28 (discussing advisability of maintaining such a roster, con-
sidering additional costs in locating qualified panelists, maintaining contacts with them
through inactive periods, and other bureaucratic nuances). A more practical suggestion was
the creation of a "super institution" which would run a central repository of names of active
arbitrators worldwide, including a description of their qualifications. See Hans Smit, The
Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?, 25
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 30-32 (1986). This would offer parties to international agree-
ments easy access to a comprehensive database, enabling them to select arbitrators who
have the desirable qualifications. Id.
222 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1807, § 1, 27 I.L.M. at 385.
223 Id.
12 Code of Conduct for Proceedings Under Chapters 18 and 19 of the United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement, 54 Fed. Reg. 14,371, 14,371 (preamble), 14,371-72 (Indepen-
dence and Impartiality) (1989). The Code of Conduct is very strict in prohibiting the panel-
ists from having any interests or relationships that create the appearance of bias and there-
fore should be interpreted to prohibit the appointment of a government official or employee
as a panelist. See Azrieli, supra note 12, at 428.
225 See ICSID Convention, supra note 148, art. 14, §1; IACAC RULES, supra note 214,
art. 6, § 4; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 11, § 5 & art. 12, §§ 1-2 (arbitrator
may be challenged on basis of circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts to impartiality
or independence); ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 2, § 7; AAA RULEs, supra note 177, art.
19 (applies only to person appointed "neutral arbitrator").
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of a panelist. For example, the Canada-U.S. FTA requires that
four out of the five panelists (the party-appointed panelists) shall
be citizens of the appointing parties, two from each county, and it
is silent with respect to the nationality of the fifth panelist.2 26
In the case of the Egypt-Israel boundary arbitration, the two
party-appointed arbitrators were nationals, whereas the other
three arbitrators were nationals of other countries.2 Other institu-
tions follow this rule with respect to arbitrators appointed by the
existing panelists, by an institution, or when a vacancy is filled by
a chairman. In all such cases the rules require appointment of pan-
elists who are not nationals of one of the disputing parties. 228 It
should be noted, however, that today the significance of nationality
or citizenship is diminishing, while a person's residency has a grow-
ing importance.
The lack of any standard in the FTA relating to the panelists'
qualifications and impartiality encourages a quick look into the
parties' respective arbitration laws. Israeli arbitration law229 deals
with the issue in several contexts. First, it provides that a court
may revoke an arbitrator's appointment when it appears that the
arbitrator "is not worthy of the parties' trust. '230 Second, a court is
empowered to revoke an arbitration award, in whole or in part,
when "the arbitrator acted without authority or extended the au-
thority given to him by the arbitration agreement."'231 In defining
the arbitrator's authority and duties, the Israeli arbitration law
provides that an arbitrator has a fiduciary duty towards both par-
ties, the breach of which creates a cause of action for damages
22 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1807, § 3, 27 I.L.M. at 385.
227 See Taba Beachfront Agreement, supra note 123, art. 1, § 1, 26 I.L.M. at 1, 2-3.
22' See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 11, § 5 (appointing authority
"shall take into account ... the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality
other than those of the parties"); IACAC RULES, supra note 214, art. 6, § 4 (same); AAA
RULES, supra note 177, art. 6, § 4 (same); ICSID Convention, supra note 148, art. 38, 17
U.S.T. at 1285-86 ("Arbitrators appointed by the Chairman ... shall not be nationals of
the [parties]."); ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 2, § 7 (appointed arbitrators "shall be cho-
sen from a country other than those of which the parties are nationals"). With respect to
requirements of objectivity and impartiality in AAA industry-panel arbitration, see Garylee
Cox, The Selection Process and the Appointment of Arbitrators, Ass. J., June 1991, at 28,
31.
229 See Hok Haborerut, supra note 79.
210 Id. § 11(1). All quotations are the author's translations from the Hebrew-written
Israeli Arbitration Law. An English translation of the statute is available in 3 INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 79, IV Israel, at 1-17.
231 Id. § 24(3).
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against the arbitrator.3 2 Israeli case law has applied the standards
of strict impartiality and expanded the fiduciary duty owed by the
arbitrator.2"' In that context, case law covers the questions of dis-
closure of any facts, relationships, or any other interests that might
cause real or perceived partiality on the part of the arbitrator, an
issue that has not been dealt with by arbitration law.
Similar to Israeli law, the Federal Arbitration Act in the
United States provides that "[w]here there was evident partiality
or corruption in the arbitrators, or [any] of them" the award may
be vacated by the courts.23 4 In trying to define a disqualifying par-
tiality or the appearance thereof, one court has said, "The type of
relationship which would appear to disqualify is one from which it
may not be unreasonable to infer an absence of impartiality, the
presence of bias or the existence of some interest on the part of the
arbitrator in the welfare of one of the parties. ' 235 Courts have dealt
with different types of relationships that might render an arbitra-
tor an appearance of partiality, such as family, social, creditor-
debtor,3 6 and certain business relations.23 7
In conclusion, it is recommended that the FTA should set
rules with respect to the Panelists' moral character and impartial-
ity, freedom from improper influence by either party, nationality,
experience in international arbitration, as well as expertise in the
subject matter of the dispute. These rules could be incorporated in
222 Id. § 30.
233 See, e.g., C.F. (Tel Aviv) 3251/72, Davidovitz v. Vaknin, Psakim 1974(3), 13 (misrep-
resentation by arbitrator as to conflict of interests amounts to gross injustice); C.F. (Tel
Aviv) 1321/84, C.F. (Tel Aviv) 1367/84, Parhi Nizan, Ltd. v. Halevi & Co., Ltd., Psakim
1987(1), 475 (hidden connections between arbitrator and party would justify voidance of
award if suspicion of favoritism, or if malice present).
234 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see also UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
§ 12(a)(2), 7 U.L.A. 140 (1985).
"' Cross Properties, Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., 225 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016 (App. Div. 1962),
aff'd, 187 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1962). The proof of such interest on the part of the arbitrator in
the outcome of the arbitration should be direct and definite and not remote, uncertain, or
speculative. Saville Int'l, Inc. v. Galanti Group, Inc., 438 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); cf. In Re Reale v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 438 N.Y.S.2d 140, 140 (App. Div. 1981)
(ruling arbitrator should be disqualified for bids based on something other than exposure to
facts of case); Giddens v. Bd. of Educ., 75 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ill. 1947) (ruling bias may be
small but it must be direct and capable of demonstration).
236 See DOMKE, supra note 63, § 21.02, at 320-23.
237 See, e.g., Hodges Int'l, Inc. v. Rembrandt Fabrics, Ltd., 353 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (App.
Div. 1974) (holding fact that arbitrator was business acquaintance of party insufficient to
disqualify), affd 38 N.Y.2d 502 (1976); see also Reale v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 438 N.Y.
S.2d 140 (App. Div. 1981) (ruling arbitrator should be disqualified for bids only if it is based
on something other than exposure to facts of case).
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a separate document entitled "Code of Conduct," which would be
made an integral part of the FTA by the Joint Committee through
its authority to amend the FTA.238
D. Dispute Settlement or Dispute Resolution?
The FTA distinguishes itself in creating a non-binding dispute
resolution mechanism; the choice of words: "dispute settlement,"
for Article 19, as opposed to "dispute resolution," is not coinciden-
tal. Unlike the Canada-U.S. FTA, which entitles its Article 1806
"arbitration," the U.S.-Israel FTA chooses to emphasize the concil-
iatory elements of its mechanism, and thus neglects to create a po-
tent dispute resolution mechanism. As described earlier, the FTA
provides that, if Consultations and the Joint Committee efforts to
reach an amicable settlement fail, "either Party may refer the mat-
ter to a conciliation panel."
The choice of the word "conciliation" has its roots in the
drafters' reluctance to provide the Panel with any binding pow-
ers.239 The "Conciliation panel" is required "to resolve the dispute
through the agreement of the Parties. ' 240 Only if the panel fails to
bring the parties to an amicable settlement,
it shall, within three months after the first member is appointed,
present to the Parties a report containing findings of fact, its de-
termination as to whether either Party has failed to carry out its
obligations under the Agreement or whether a measure taken by
either Party severely distorts the balance of trade benefits ac-
corded by [the FTA] or substantially undermines the fundamen-
tal objectives of [the FTA], and a proposal on the settlement of
the dispute. 41
The agreement specifically states that the Panel's Report "shall be
non-binding. "242
Despite the similarities between the U.S.-Israel FTA's mecha-
nism and the Canada-U.S. FTA's mechanism with respect to the
composition, procedure, and content of the Panel's Report, the
U.S.-Israel FTA chooses not to subject the parties to binding arbi-
2"8 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 17, § 2(c), 24 I.L.M. at 664; see supra notes 190-
92 and accompanying text.
2'9 Id. art. 19, § 1(e), 24 LL.M. at 664 ("The report of the panel shall be non-
binding.").
240 Id.
241 Id.
2 2 Id.
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tration. In view of the fact that the Panel's final report is submit-
ted to the parties only after three stages of conciliatory discussions
have failed to produce a settlement, it is puzzling why the drafters
of the FTA believed that such a report would miraculously bring
the disputing parties together.243
Additionally, in light of this clear determination to avoid a
binding third-party determination of a dispute, a different provi-
sion of the agreement should come under question. The Agreement
provides that "[ilf the conciliation panel under this Agreement or
any other applicable international dispute settlement mechanism
has been invoked by either Party with respect to any matter, the
mechanism invoked shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that mat-
ter. 2 44 What did the parties intend in "other applicable interna-
tional dispute settlement mechanism"? Is the correct interpreta-
tion of that section that either party may invoke any dispute
resolution mechanism under similar international agreements, or
that only a "dispute settlement mechanism" may be invoked, that
is, a mechanism that is non-binding? Should this section be inter-
preted as forbidding either party from resorting to a binding dis-
pute resolution mechanism?
The enigmatic "Conciliation panel" provision comes to an end
with an even more confusing section, which provides that, after the
presentation of the Panel's Report, "the affected Party shall be en-
titled to take any appropriate measure. ' 245 What is "any appropri-
ate measure"? The FTA fails to define this phrase. Furthermore, if
the Panel's Report is "non-binding," why should a party be enti-
tled to take any measures against the other party? Would not that
party be subjecting itself to a new and legitimate claim by the
243 The choice of words is not, in itself, crucial. For example, the ICC Rules refer to ICC
arbitration as a procedure aimed at settling disputes. See ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 2,
§ 1 ("The Court of Arbitration ... settle[s] disputes."), art. 2, § 2 ("The dispute may be
settled by a sole arbitrator or by three arbitrators." (emphasis added)). At the same time,
the arbitrator's "settling" award is fully binding and enforceable. See id. art. 24, § 1 ("The
arbitral award shall be final."); art. 24, § 2 ("By submitting the dispute to arbitration by the
[ICC], the parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out the resulting award
without delay and to have waived their right to any form of appeal.... ."). Evidently, in the
eyes of the drafters of the ICC Rules, it is possible to "settle" a dispute through a binding
arbitration. The word "settle", in that context, does not mean "compromise," but "resolve."
See JOHN A. YOGIS, CANADIAN LAW DICTIONARY 204 (2d ed. 1990) ("Settlement generally, the
conclusive fixing or resolving of a matter; the arrangement of a final disposition of
it."(citations omitted)).
U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19 § 1(f), 24 I.L.M. at 665 (emphasis added).
',5 Id. art. 19, § 2.
[Vol. 67:187
ARBITRATION
other party?2 46
The ambiguity of the U.S.-Israel FTA was not followed by the
negotiators of the Canada-U.S. FTA, which provides that, after the
failure of amicable resolution of the dispute through consultations,
the Commission "shall refer a dispute . . . to binding arbitra-
tion. '247 The agreement further provides for the "arbitration
panel" to conduct its resolution procedure and file and present a
final report with the Commission which, in turn, "shall agree on
the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with
the recommendation of the panel. '248
Similarly, the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace makes the distinc-
tion between a settlement through negotiations or conciliations,
and the ultimate submission to binding arbitration.2 49 The Model
BIT also requires a party to a dispute to "initially seek to resolve
the dispute by consultation and negotiation, which may include
the use of non-binding, third-party procedures. '250 However, if
such dispute is not resolved through consultation and negotiation,
it is then submitted to a binding and enforceable procedure. 251 The
ICC Rules also emphasize that "[s]ettlement is a desirable resolu-
tion for business disputes of international character," and provide
for a procedure of conciliatory discussions.25 2 However, if such a
conciliation process fails, or is refused by one of the parties, the
dispute is then referred to binding arbitration. The UNCITRAL
Model Law provides for settlement opportunities even during the
arbitral proceedings, 253 but, in doing so, its arbitration procedure
remains binding.25 4 The IACICA identically provides for an arbi-
141 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1806, § 3, 27 I.L.M. at 385. The Canada-U.S.
FTA provides a similar, though better-defined remedy for such cases:
If a Party fails to implement in a timely fashion the findings of a binding arbitra-
tion panel and the Parties are unable to agree on appropriate compensation or
remedial action, then the other Party shall have the right to suspend the applica-
tion of equivalent benefits of this Agreement to the non-complying Party.
Id. Such language should be added to the U.S.-Israel FTA as a definition to the words "any
appropriate measure." U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(2); see also infra notes 261-67
and accompanying text (discussing limited enforceability of international arbitration
awards).
217 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1806, § 1, 27 I.L.M. at 384-85.
218 Id. art. 1807, § 8, 27 I.L.M. at 362, 366.
249 Treaty of Peace, supra note 86, art. VII, 18 I.L.M. at 362, 366.
210 Model BIT, supra note 130, art. VI, § 2.
251 Id.
252 ICC RuLEs, supra note 165, preamble, at 574.
213 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 30, § 1.
2- Id. art. 30, § 2 ("[S]uch an award has the same status and effect as any other award
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tral decision or an award with the force of a "final judicial judg-
ment.12 55 However, it provides for a termination or a stay of the
proceeding pending settlement discussions.5 6
The ICSID, similar to the FTA, provides for a dispute settle-
ment mechanism between states (as well as between nationals of
different states); it makes a clear distinction between the desirable
stage of conciliatory discussions (and sets the necessary provisions
for such conciliation proceedings) and the need for binding arbitra-
tion. It provides separate, distinguished, and independent sets of
rules for conciliation discussions on the one hand,2 57 and rules for
arbitration on the other.258 The ICSID specifically provides that
arbitration awards
shall be binding upon the parties and shall not be subject to any
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this
Convention. Each party shall abide by and comply with the terms
of the award except to the extend that enforcement shall have
been stayed pursuant to the relevant provisions of this
Convention.2 59
The absence of a similar provision in the U.S.-Israel FTA is
unfortunate.
The above-cited agreements do not stand against amicable
resolution of international disputes, but when settlement negotia-
tions fail, the need for a binding resolution becomes unquestiona-
ble. Lindencrona and Mattsson, in their interesting proposal for
the creation of an international center for arbitration in taxation,
correctly wrote that
since arbitration is a more complicated procedure than the simple
mutual agreement procedure, it can be expected that a con-
tracting state will want to use the arbitration procedure only
when it fears that the other state is not prepared to contribute to
a solution according to the Convention in a mutual agreement.2 60
Courts in both Israel and the United States similarly take a
most favorable approach to settlement discussions between disput-
ing parties in commercial cases. In Israel, courts frequently take an
on the merits of the case.").
215 IACICA RULES, supra note 214, art. 4.
256 IACAC RULES, supra note 214.
251 ICSID Convention, supra note 148, ch. III, 17 U.S.T. at 1281-84.
'" Id. ch. IV, 17 U.S.T. at 1284.
259 Id. ch. IV, art. 53.
260 GUSTAG LINDENCRONA & Nns MArrssON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION 71 (1981).
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active role in soliciting litigating parties into a settlement.261
United States courts have widely accepted the need for aggressive
settlement initiatives, both on the trial court level and on
appeal.262
Indeed, an amicable settlement is looked upon favorably by all
international agreements in their endeavor to provide a dispute
resolution mechanism, and by courts in the United States and
Israel. As Professor Henkin noted, "[n]ations still prefer the flexi-
bility of diplomacy to the risks of third-party judgment."2 3 How-
ever, the need for, and encouragement of, amicable discussions
does not void the need for a potent procedure for resolving a dis-
pute after the parties fail to reach an amicable solution. The U.S.-
Israel FTA correctly makes a distinction between the settlement
discussions through "Consultations," settlement discussion in the
Joint Committee, and the ultimate referral to a Panel upon failure
of such Consultations to result in a settlement.264 Nevertheless, the
Agreement fails to provide the Panel with a binding force and thus
makes such proceedings futile: If the prior Consultations failed to
provide an amicable resolution, why would a Panel be more suc-
cessful in bringing the parties together?
It is recommended, therefore, that the Joint Committee
261 See Yaakov Bazak, Settling Legal Disputes Through Compromise, 27 HAPRAKLIT
325, 326-27 (1971). Dr. Bazak, who is currently the President of the District Court for Jeru-
salem, states that, in addition to the efficiency and time-saving advantages of settlement, a
binding adjudication of a commercial dispute frequently results in one of the parties feeling
deprived of its rights, "since the compromise comes in agreement and a mutual will, which
is not the case with adjudication, where the losing party never forgoes his claim against its
opponent even though losing against him in court of law." Id. at 326 (citing Rabbi Shemuel
Ayziles (Poland, 1531-1555), Comments on Sanhedrin, 6(b)). In a two-month survey con-
ducted in the District Court for Jerusalem, more than 90% of commercial cases reached a
settlement prior to final judgment by the court. Id. at 328-29.
262 See generally Irving R. Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gambit?-The Civil
Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 755 (1986) (maintaining out-of-court settle-
ments will free dockets); Teresa A. Generous & Katherine D. Knocke, "Camp"ing Is on the
Rise: A Survey of Judicially-Implemented Pre-argument Conference Programs In the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 1987 Mo. J. Disp. REsOL. 89 (1987); Steilman &
Goldman, The Settlement Conference, Experimenting with Appellate Justice, National
Center for State Courts, State Court Journal (Fall 1986); Dispute Resolution and the Ap-
pellate Courts, The Institute of Judicial Administration (1989); Roger A. Hanson, An As-
sessment of Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeals Settlement Conference Program, 18
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 177, 178 (1990).
263 HENKIN, supra note 2, at 24.
6 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(1)(b)-(d) (parties to agreement shall at-
tempt to reach mutually agreeable solution through consultation, Joint Committee, and
Conciliation panel respectively).
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amend the FTA to include language similar to that of the Canada-
U.S. FTA, or the more precise language of the ICSID, and thus
make the Panel's proceedings a more effective vehicle for resolving
disputes between the Parties.
E. The Award-Publication and Reasoning
1. Publication
The draftsmen of the FTA again demonstrated their unwill-
ingness to put any teeth into the Panel's mouth by failing to pro-
vide an express provision for the publication of the Panel's report.
It is submitted that, in the case of an international arbitration be-
tween nations, publication of a panel's award is virtually essential
for ensuring the obedience of the losing nation. Unlike decisions of
arbitration panels in international arbitration between private par-
ties, which can be enforced by local courts in the parties' respective
states, the "international society lacks an executive authority with
power to enforce the law [or arbitration awards].... Since nations
cannot be made to observe rules and keep promises, they will not
do so when they deem it in their interest not to do so."25 In the
absence of such "international executive enforcement," and realiz-
ing that "no government will observe international law 'in the
crunch, when it really hurts,'"266 it is submitted that the only
available means of enforcing a Panel's Report is through "horizon-
tal enforcement," that is, the reactions of other nations to the los-
ing party's disobedience267
Publication of the award in an international arbitration case
makes the panel's decision public, and thus makes it possible for
the winning party (even if that party is much smaller and weaker
than the losing party) to create public opinion among other states
and within the law-obedient public of the losing party. Since the
FTA gives exclusive jurisdiction to the panel under the Agree-
ment,268 and makes the Panel's Report "non-binding,"2"' there is
practically no institution to which the winning party may turn
when facing a refusal by the losing party to follow the Panel's Re-
266 HENKIN, supra note 2, at 24.
20 Id. at 97.
261 Id. at 26.
268 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19 (1)(f), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
269 Id. art. 19(1)(e), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
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port. The only way to enforce the Panel's Report, therefore, is
through public awareness and by convincing the losing party that
implementing the Panel's Report is consistent with its general na-
tional interest. Even though the implementation of a certain Re-
port might hurt the losing Party's interest with respect to the sub-
ject matter of that specific dispute, "a nation's perception of 'when
it really hurts' to observe law must take into account its interest in
law and its observance, and the costs of violation. 2 70
An additional reason for the publication of the Report is the
creation and development of trade law in general, and the setting
of precedents as between the parties to the FTA. As Lindencrona
and Mattesson note in their proposal for international arbitration
in taxation, awards are significant as a "source of law," since "con-
tinuous publication of arbitration awards can be assumed to be of
major importance for the development of international [tax]
law. '27 1 They propose, however, to set a procedure for the exclu-
sion of certain information, when such is desired by private par-
ties, "unless it is absolutely necessary in order to understand the
decision. '2 72
A quick look into other international arbitration documents
reflects the above distinction between private and international ar-
bitration. Panel reports are routinely published under the
GATT,273 and under the Canada-U.S. FTA.274 Similarly, the arbi-
tration award under the Egypt-Israel Treaty of Peace was pub-
lished as soon as it was handed down.275
As contrasted with arbitration between nations, awards in in-
ternational arbitration between private parties do not require pub-
lication, and in many cases, publication could change the inherent
270 HENKIN, supra note 2, at 97.
271 LINDENCRONA & MATrSSON, supra note 260, at 76.
272 Id. at 76-77.
273 See Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Japanese Agricultural Import Quotas
("GATT-12") and Japanese-U.S. Exchange of Letters on Beef and Citrus, Nov. 18, 1987,
U.S.-Japan, GATT Doc. 1/6253, 27 I.L.M. 1539 (1988); see also Herb Vest Resolving FTA
Dispute Resolution, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2, 1992, at 2 (GATT consists of extensive and well-devel-
oped system for resolving and publishing disputes).
274 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1807 § 7, 27 I.L.M. 281, 385 ("Unless the
Commission agrees otherwise, the final report of the panel shall be published along with any
separate opinions, and any written views that either party desires to be published."); see,
e.g., In Re Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 6 (U.S.-Canada FTA
Binational Panel Review Oct. 16, 1989).
276 See Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area, 27 I.L.M. 1421 (Egypt-
Israel Arbitration Tribunal 1988).
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privacy of the arbitration procedure, which is one of its major ad-
vantages. 76 Enforcement, on the other hand, is routinely available
to private parties based on the international conventions and set
procedure in local courts. 2
In conclusion, the absence of a provision requiring publication
of the Panel's Report under the U.S.-Israel FTA constitutes a sub-
stantial shortcoming.
[V]iolations of international law are not common enough to de-
stroy the sense of law, of obligation to comply, of the right to ask
for a compliance and to react to violations .... Agreements are
not violated with such frequency that nations cease to enter into
them, or to expect performance or redress for violation.278
The arbitration Panel under the U.S.-Israel FTA is muted through
the non-publication of its Report, as non-publication deprives the
winning party from its sole means of enforcement, namely, public
opinion and respect for international law.2
278 See JuLIAN D. M. LAU, The Case for Publication of Arbitrator Awards, in THE ART
OF ARaITRATION 224-28 (Jan. C. Schultz & Albert J. Van Der Berg, eds., 1982) (indicating
reasons for not publishing resolutions of private disliutes).
" See, e.g., AAA RULES, supra note 177, § 46. Occasionally, AAA arbitration awards
are submitted for publication in International Legal Materials, such as, when a government
agency is involved, like the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation. See 11 I.L.M.
1216 (1972); 17 I.L.M. 1321 (1978); 14 I.L.M. 1210 (1975); 27 I.L.M. 487 (1988); 27 I.L.M.
1260 (1988); see also ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 23(2) (copies of awards shall be made
available "to the parties but to no one else"); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art.
35(1)-(2).
The ICSID convention is of specific interest since it regulates arbitration both between
a private foreign party and a contracting state and between contracting states. ICSfD Con-
vention, supra note 148, art. 25. It provides that an award will not be published without the
consent of the parties. Id. art. 48(5). The award is "binding on the parties and shall not be
subject to any appeal." Id. art. 53(1). Each contracting state is required to recognize an
award and to designate a competent court or other authority for the purpose of enforcing
the award. Id. art. 54(1)-(2). In addition, the ICSID convention provides for a parallel and
ultimate jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice to deal with "any dispute arising
between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of [the] Convention
which is not settled by negotiation." Id. art. 64. This definition allows the referral of dis-
putes to the International Court of Justice even after the conclusion of arbitration proceed-
ings. Id. Proceedings in the International Court of Justice, needless to say, are public.
278 HENKIN, supra note 2, at 97.
279 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(1)(e). The winning party may, subject to con-
fidentiality questions, make a favorable Panel report public through its own spokesperson.
However, in the absence of a provision for publication as of right under the FTA, a politi-
cally stronger losing party may apply pressure on a weaker opponent, preventing it from
making a winning award public.
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2. Reasoning
The FTA should be complimented with respect to the detailed
instructions to the Panel as to the content of its Report, namely,
(1) findings of fact, (2) the Panel's determination as to whether
either Party has failed to carry out its obligations under the Agree-
ment or whether a measure taken by either Party severely distorts
the balance of trade benefits accorded by the FTA or substantially
undermines the fundamental objectives of the FTA, and (3) a pro-
posal on the settlement of the dispute.2 0 Even though compli-
ments are in order as to the requirements of detailing factual find-
ings, and setting forth a "proposal," the Agreement once again fails
to address an essential element when it fails to require the Panel
to supply the reasoning for its proposal.281
The absence of a requirement that a Panel detail the reasons
for its conclusions was followed by the Canada-U.S. FTA, which
uses very similar language to that of the U.S.-Israel FTA quoted
previously." 2 It may well be that, in some cases, a comprehensive
presentation of the Panel's factual findings would suffice to make
its conclusions reasonable. However, that might not always be the
case. In certain complex disputes, there would be a definite need
for the Panel to substantiate its award or proposal with convincing
reasons.
Such was the opinion of the negotiators of the IACICA,283 the
ICSID Convention,284 and the UNCITRAL Model Law.285 The ICC
Rules require the arbitrator's award to "[deal] with the merits of
the case,' 26 but an explicit requirement for "reasons" is absent.
The AAA Rules do not require the arbitrator to state the reasons
280 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(1)(e), 24 LL.M. at 665.
281 It is submitted that the Agreement should have offered a binding procedure and
therefore required the Panel to issue a binding judgment or an award and not a "proposal."
However, the following discussion with respect to the need for reasoning is equally applica-
ble to the more amicable procedure chosen by the parties. Furthermore, the need for includ-
ing reasoning in the report might even be greater where the parties are supposed to follow
the Panel's report on an amicable basis absent any binding power.
282 See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1807 § 5, 27 I.L.M. at 385.
283 IACICA, supra note 214, 14 I.L.M. art. 32(3) ("The arbitral Tribunals shall state the
reasons upon which the award is based, .. ").
284 ICSID Convention, supra note 148, art. 48(3) ("The award shall deal with every
question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon which it is based.").
285 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 31(2) ("The award shall state the rea-
sons upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be
given . .. ").
288 ICC Rules, supra note 165, art. 20(1).
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for the award. 87
United States law has been clear with respect to the issuance
of arbitral opinions in private commercial arbitrations. "[W]ritten
opinions accompanying commercial awards might serve as a guide
for future business relations and the development of customs and
practices in the trade as well as discouraging recurring disputes on
similar issues."2 The drawbacks, however, are the exposure to
challenge in the courts, prolonging the process of arbitration solu-
tion, wasting of the arbitrator's time on useless drafting, and un-
necessary costs. The Supreme Court has made it clear that arbitra-
tion law does not require arbitrators to set forth their findings or
the reasons for their conclusions.289
Israel's arbitration law, in dealing with arbitration between
private parties, similarly does not require the arbitrator to set
forth the reasons for his decisions. On the other hand, it does au-
thorize a court to void an arbitration award, in whole or in part,
when the arbitration agreement requires the arbitrator to give rea-
sons for the decision, and he fails to do So.290
Whatever the respective laws of the parties are, they address
solely commercial arbitration between private parties. Conse-
287 See AAA RULES, supra note 177, 42-45. It is possible that both institutions (the ICC
and the AAA) were hesitant to require an arbitrator to engage in an extensive drafting of an
opinion, considering the fact that an ad hoc arbitration between private parties should be
handled with minimum expenses and often has little social importance. Additionally, the
cost of arbitration is justifiably considered by private parties when choosing among arbitra-
tion institutions. As discussed below, that consideration is absent in arbitration between
nations, specifically with respect to continuing dispute resolution mechanisms under a long
term agreement such as a free trade agreement. See infra notes 288-294 and accompanying
text.
288 DOMKE, supra note 63, at 436.
288 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
598 (1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award."); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) (arbitrators need
not disclose the facts or reasons behind their award); see also Kurt Orban Co. v. Angeles
Metal Sys., 573 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Arbitrators are not required to disclose the
basis upon which their awards are made .... ."); Sober v. Hertz, Warner and Co., 469 F.2d
1211 (2d Cir. 1972); Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club v. Bailes, 33 Cal. Rptr. 533, 538 (Ct.
App. 1963) (arbitrator not required "to spell out the rationale of his decision"); Willow
Fabrics v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 248 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (App. Div. 1964) ("The
validity of the award is unaffected by the absence of a recital of the reasons for the
award."); Bay Ridge Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan, 254 N.Y.S.2d 616, 618 (App. Div.
1964).
290 Hok Haborerut, supra note 79, § 24(6); see also C.F. (Tel Aviv) 1321/84, C.F. (Tel
Aviv) 1367/84, Parhi Nizan, Ltd. v. Halevi & Co., Psakim 1987(1) 475 (when parties agree
that the arbitrator need not give reasons in its award, court may not void award for failure
to do so).
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quently, considerations of cost and time saving are paramount, to-
gether with the need to minimize avenues of appeal, which en-
hances the expediency and finality of the process. It is a wholly
different situation where the arbitration is between nations. There,
an appeal is not available,291 and the need for publication, as dis-
cussed above, together with the opportunity to "create law" as to
the specific agreement in dispute and as to international relations
in general, outweighs any considerations of costs and time saving.
Additionally, since a Panel's decision may have extensive ramifica-
tions on a nation-party's economic interests, there exists a crucial
need for ensuring a correct, exhaustive, and well-supported deci-
sion. Justice Barak explained the need for a written and reasoned
opinion:
Many are the ideas whose downfall was brought about by the
need to explain them, since they contained only external force for
which it proved impossible to find a foundation. The duty of giv-
ing reasons is among the most important challenges facing a judge
who seeks to exercise discretion. Justice Landau described this in
the following words:
"Judging through the use of discretion must not become
arbitrary judging. There is no better tested way of avoid-
ing this danger than the full explanation of the judgment.
This kind of explanation trains the judge to think clearly
and to raise his reasons-including his intuitive thoughts,
to which Pound referred-above his subconscious, to the
light of day, in order that they should stand the test of
criticism by the appeals court, by professionals, and by
the general public. '29 2
An arbitration award between nations, unlike private commer-
cial arbitration, does not enjoy the use of an enforcing authority.
As discussed previously, a nation winning an arbitration against a
fellow nation is dependent for the enforcement of its rights on
"horizontal enforcement," namely, creating public opinion among
the society of nations which would pressure the losing party to
obey the arbitration award.293 Such conviction, it is argued, could
be carried only by a well-reasoned arbitral decision. Reasoning is
201 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(1)(f), 24 I.L.M. at 665 ("The mechanism
invoked shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that matter.").
201 AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DisCRTION 23 (1989) (citing Landau, Rule and Discretion
in Lawmaking, 1 MISHPATM 292, 303 (1968)).
203 See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 26.
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essential "to convince the parties and the public of the lack of par-
tiality of the adjudication. '294
In conclusion, absent a specific amendment to the Agreement,
Panels under the U.S.-Israel FTA may interpret Article 19(1)(e) as
requiring a Panel to include in its decision not only its findings of
fact but also the reasons for its "proposal."
F. Provisional, Interim, and Supplemental Remedies
The FTA does not explicitly give the Panel any authority
apart from issuing its main Report. The dispute resolution process
under the Agreement is lengthy. It goes through an unspecified pe-
riod until exhausting Consultations, sixty days for discussions by
the Joint Committee, forty-five days for the composition of a
Panel, and another three months until the issuance of the Re-
port.295 One must realize that, by its nature, such a process can
have only a limited expediency, considering the complexity of the
issues involved and the great importance which the parties attach
to controversies involving their trade rights. On the other hand,
the passage of time might cause the injured Party substantial, and
occasionally irreparable, damage. For this reason, the constantly
developing law of international arbitration has created three arbi-
tral tools: (1) provisional remedies-pre-arbitration remedies,
aimed at preserving the subject matter of the dispute, to be
granted by a 'referee' or any other pre-panel authority, as agreed
by the parties, (2) interim remedies, to be given at the request of
either party, during the arbitration, by the arbitrator or by a court,
as it sees fit, and (3) supplemental remedies to be issued by the
arbitrator after the issuance of a final award, usually as a correc-
tive or an enforcement measure.29 The following discussion deals
with the availability of such measures in international arbitration
agreements, in the parties respective arbitration laws, and consid-
ers the need for such authority under the FTA.297
294 BARAK, supra note 292, at 190.
215 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(1)(c)-(f), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
29 See, e.g., AAA RULES, supra note 177, § 34. The terms "provisional," "interim," and
"supplemental" remedies are used by courts and commentators interchangeably. In order to
facilitate a distinctive analysis, the above definitions are intended to differentiate between
remedies granted prior, during, and after the arbitration proceeding.
" The discussion equally applies to the Canada-U.S. FTA, which, like its predecessor,
does not offer such extra-award remedies.
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1. Provisional Remedies
The need for a provisional relief in the form of a pre-arbitral
preservatory order is well-established. Naturally, such relief cannot
be given by the arbitrators, who, at that time, have not yet been
nominated. Thus, in private commercial arbitration, courts consti-
tute the sole address for requests for provisional relief. In a leading
case, Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel,2 8
which involved a contract for the design and construction of a
communication system for the Israeli Air Force,299 Sperry moved
for and was granted by the district court an order enjoining Israel
from presenting a clean irrevocable letter of credit for $15 million
to Citibank, N.A.300 On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the dis-
trict court's authority to grant such a preservatory pre-arbitration
order, but found that, in that case, Sperry had made no showing
that it would be irreparably injured in the absence of such an
injunction.301
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act includes no
provision expressly authorizing courts to grant provisional reme-
dies with respect to contracts that include an arbitration
clause.3 02Some commentators argue that
the parties' election of arbitration as the means for dispute settle-
ment precludes court action other than that required to enforce
the arbitration agreement and to convert an award into a judg-
ment . .. [since] all forms of relief should be determined solely
by the arbitrator and should be granted according to his concepts
of necessity and utility.303
Most courts, however, recognize that in special circumstances a
court may grant preservatory relief to a party prior to ordering the
commencement of arbitration proceedings under a binding con-
tract.30 Thus, courts have granted requests for attachment to pre-
208 670 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982).
299 Id. at 9.
200 Id. at 10 n.2.
301 Id. at 11.
302 But see 9 U.S.C. § 8 (1988). The Federal Arbitration Act makes an exception for
admiralty arbitrations, allowing libel and seizure of a ship or other property of the adverse
party in order to protect an aggrieved party and offering the security of attachment to fulfill
the ultimate arbitral award. Id.
203 Do i , supra note 63, at 402 (citing Linwood v. Sherry, 171 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct.
1958), aff'd, 181 N.Y.S.2d 772 (App. Div. 1958); Brandt v. Lawson Assocs., 196 N.Y.S.2d 835
(Sup.Ct. 1960).
z04 DoziKE, supra note 63, at 402 "[T]he availability of provisional relief by courts does
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serve property for the satisfaction of a future award or to secure
the subject matter of the arbitration.30 5 Similarly, courts have is-
sued injunctive relief in order to preserve the status quo or to pro-
tect a party from irreparable injury.306
The availability of pre-arbitral relief in the form of attach-
ment in cases involving international commercial arbitration be-
tween private parties under the New York Convention 07 proved to
be a more difficult issue, and courts reached contradictory conclu-
sions as to their availability.308
Israeli arbitration law explicitly provides for pre-arbitral relief
by the courts, including an order for the attachment of properties,
for preventing a party from leaving the country, for requiring se-
curity from a party, for appointment of a receiver, or any order or
injunction as the court may find necessary. 0 9 Such an order would
be valid until the final arbitration award, or until the appointed
arbitrator changes it.3 10
International commercial arbitration institutions commonly
not destroy the purpose and methods of the arbitration process, which the parties envisaged
when they agreed to the settlement of their disputes by arbitration." Id. (citing Katz v.
Burkin, 3 A.D.2d 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957) (in such cases, "necessity rather than conve-
nience should be the test")).
"05 See Compania Panamena v. International Union Line, 188 N.Y.S.2d 708, 709 (1959)
("[A] warrant to secure the collection of any award is as much an enforcement of the award
as a judgment to be entered upon any award made."); see also Anaconda v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 42, 44 (1944) (attachment used to preserve property for arbitration
award); Shinto Shipping Co. v. Fibrex Shipping Co., 425 F. Supp. 1088, 1089 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (same).
306 See, e.g., Faculty of C.U.N.Y at Queens College v. City of New York, 531 N.Y.S.2d
665, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (injunction granted to avoid irreparable injury); see also DOMKE,
supra note 62, § 26:03, at 407 n.3 (citing Tryan Vending Indus. v. Maple Lanes, N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 25, 1964); Saferstein v. Wendy Comb Assoc., 523 N.Y.S.2d 725, 729 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(same); American Eutectic Weldings Alloys Sales Co. v. Flynn, 161 A.2d 364, 367 (Pa. 1960)
(injunction granted to preserve status quo pending arbitration).
"I New York Convention, supra note 66.
308 See Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., 919 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
injunction against alleged misuse of trademark, pending outcome of arbitration proceedings,
"is not precluded by the Convention but rather consistent with its provisions and spirit");
Cooper v. Ateliers de La Motobecana, S.A., 442 N.E.2d 1239, 1240-42 (N.Y. 1982) (court
refused to attach assets of French corporation in U.S., holding such relief inconsistent with
New York Convention and policy "to minimize the uncertainty of enforcing arbitration
agreements and to avoid the vagaries of foreign law for international traders"); Drexel Burn-
ham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 139 A.D.2d 323 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 73
N.Y.2d 703 (1988). See generally Hoellering, Interim Measures and Arbitration: The Situa-
tion in the United States, AR. J., June 1991, at 22, 26; McLendon, State International
Arbitration Laws: Are They Needed or Desirable?, 11 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 245 (1990).
1o" See Haborerut, supra note 79, §§ 16(a)-(b).
310 Id. § 17.
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provide for a pre-arbitral preservatory relief, explicitly indicating
that a party may seek such pre-arbitration relief without injuring
its right to enforce the arbitration clause.31' Until recently, how-
ever, none of the institutions dealt with the need to grant such
relief prior to the appointment of an arbitrator or a tribunal.
The first to embark on such an experiment was the ICC, which
issued, on January 1, 1990, the "ICC Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Refe-
ree Procedure. 3 12 These rules provide for "the immediate appoint-
ment of a person (the "Referee") who has the power to make cer-
tain orders prior to the arbitral tribunal or national court
competent to deal with the case (the "competent jurisdiction") be-
ing seized of it."' '31 The Referee is empowered to "order any con-
servatory measures or any measures of restoration that are ur-
gently necessary to prevent either immediate damage or
irreparable loss and so to safeguard any of the rights or property of
one of the parties," order the making of "any payment which
ought to be made," order a party to "take any step which ought to
be taken according to the contract between the parties, including
the signing or delivery of any document or the procuring by a
party of the signature or delivery of a document," and, in general,
order the production or preservation of evidence.314 The Referee is
authorized to "conduct the proceedings in the manner which he
considers appropriate for the purpose for which he was appointed"
and is authorized to request the submission of written documents,
conduct independent investigation or inquiry, obtain expert re-
ports, and question any person he chooses. 1 5
The rules make sure that the new procedure does not infringe
on the arbitrator's authority:
The Referee's order does not pre-judge the substance of the case
nor shall it bind any competent jurisdiction which may hear any
question, issue or dispute in respect of which the order has been
"I See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 9; ICC RULES, supra note
165, art. 8(5) ("[Blefore the file is transmitted to the arbitrator, and in exceptional circum-
stances even thereafter, the parties shall be at liberty to apply to any competent judicial
authority for interim or conservatory measures, and they shall not by so doing be held to
infringe the agreement to arbitrate or to affect the relevant powers reserved to the
arbitrator.").
312 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES FOR A PRE-ARrrRAL REFEREE PROCE-
DURE (1990), reprinted in 1 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 402 (1990).
313 Id. art. 1.1.
314 Id. art. 2.1.
315 Id. art. 5.
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made. The order of the Referee shall, however, remain enforced
unless and until the Referee or competent jurisdiction has de-
cided otherwise.31 6
By creating the Referee procedure, the ICC "introduce[d] a nov-
elty in international arbitration." ' None of the other interna-
tional arbitration institutions have tried to deal with the need for
pre-arbitral relief in international commercial arbitration. Though
no study has been published regarding their success, the ICC's
Referee rules offer an innovative method for dealing with that
need.
There is no precedent for a pre-arbitral provisional relief in
international arbitration where nations are the parties to the dis-
pute. The need in that context, however, seems even greater. As
distinguished from arbitration between private parties, even those
residing in different countries, a competent local court does not
constitute an accessible forum for a disputing nation when seeking
urgent provisional relief, prior to commencing an international ar-
bitration. As previously discussed, such a request would normally
be granted in arbitration between private parties and would not
infringe on the party's rights under the contractual arbitration
clause. However, in the case of an agreement between nations for
arbitration as an exclusive means of resolving disputes, no such
competent forum is available for seeking urgent, temporary relief.
Furthermore, in the case of the U.S.-Israel FTA, seeking relief
from another forum, even if competent, might make that forum an
exclusive jurisdiction over the whole dispute under Article 19(1)(f)
of the Agreement, and thus prevent the party from proceeding to
arbitrate its claims.
It is therefore recommended that the Joint Committee consid-
ers the possibility of amending the Agreement to include: (1) a
procedure similar to the ICC pre-arbitral referee procedure, by
which the Joint Committee would be required, at the request of a
party, to appoint a Referee who would be authorized to order tem-
porary, conservatory relief at the request of one party, even prior
to the referral of the dispute to a panel under Article 19(1)(b); and
(2) a provision that a request of a party, filed with any other com-
petent international dispute resolution forum, for temporary, con-
316 Id. art. 6.
M Hans Smit, Provisional Relief in International Arbitration: The ICC and Other
Proposed Rules, 1 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 388 (1990).
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servatory relief with respect to a dispute under the Agreement,
would not infringe upon that party's right to refer the matter to a
Panel under Article 19(1)(b).
The need for such provisional pre-arbitration relief in trade
disputes is forcible, and may arise with respect to perishable goods
that are already in transit, goods that might lose their market with
the passage of a few months, or a late delivery that would consti-
tute a breach of contract with the ultimate purchaser. In any such
circumstances, a per se solution could always be found, subject to
arrangements under which the party seeking provisional relief
would undertake to cover any loss for the other party in accor-
dance with the final Panel's award, or until the Panel changes the
pre-arbitral order.
2. Interim Measures
The need for interim measures is quite similar to the case for
provisional relief: it is normally aimed at the preservation of a sta-
tus quo, or at the prevention of irreparable damage to the com-
plaining party pending the outcome of the arbitration. However,
interim measures are given only after a competent panel of arbitra-
tors has seized jurisdiction and holds the full power to resolve the
whole dispute. Interim measures may be ordered by the arbitra-
tors, or by a competent court, soon after the commencement of the
arbitration proceedings, or at any time during the proceedings, but
prior to the issuance of a final award. The authority of the arbitra-
tors to grant such interim relief or a partial temporary award is
perceived as part of their authority to resolve the dispute between
the parties. The arbitrators normally enjoy free access to all the
relevant facts of the dispute, which enables them to grant and
modify interim relief as the proceedings advance.3 18
As shown below, unlike provisional relief, which is "a novelty
in international arbitration, arbitrators' authority to grant interim
relief is widely recognized. '3 19 However, neither the U.S.-Israel
FTA nor the Canada-U.S. FTA expressly authorizes the Panel to
grant such interim relief. One may argue that the absence of an
explicit provision does not necessarily mean that the drafters of
those agreements intended to negate the possibility of granting in-
""' See infra notes 382-88 and accompanying text (discussing Panel's powers of con-
ducting independent investigations).
"I' Smit, supra note 317, at 388.
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terim relief by a Panel, especially in view of most other interna-
tional arbitration institutions' inclusion of such authority in their
rules.320 On the other hand, the detailed procedure which both
agreements include, especially the later Canada-U.S. FTA, weak-
ens that argument and supports the contention that the drafters
intentionally excluded interim authority, limiting the Panel's au-
thority to the issuance of only one final Award/Report.
The ICC Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law both provide
for interim measures to be granted by a competent court during
the arbitration proceedings.3 21 Even though the ICC Rules do not
explicitly provide for interim orders by the arbitrators themselves,
the language of its rule may comfortably be interpreted to include
such authority. The UNCITRAL Model Law includes an addi-
tional provision specifically stating the power of the arbitral tribu-
nal itself (apart from the above authority of a court) to order such
interim measures. 22 Similarly, the AAA Rules provide for the arbi-
trator to issue any interim orders "as may be deemed necessary to
safeguard the property that is the subject matter of the arbitration
without prejudice to the rights of the parties or to the final deter-
mination of the dispute.31 23 Almost identical language is used by
the ICSID Convention,324 which applies to arbitration between a
private party and a contracting nation, as well as arbitration be-
tween contracting nations.2 3
321 See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text (discussing authority to grant interim
relief).
321 See ICC RULiES, supra note 165, art. 8(5); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156,
art. 9 ("It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request before or
during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court to
grant such measure.").
322 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 17.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of
a party, order any party to take such interim measure of protection as the arbitral
tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute.
The arbitral tribunal may require any party to provide appropriate security in
connection with such measure.
Id.; see also UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 157, art. 26 ("Such interim measures may be
established in the form of an interim award.").
323 AAA RULES, supra note 177, § 34; see also AAA INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES,
supra note 179, art. 22.
32 ICSID Convention, supra note 148, art. 47.
115 See ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
(1991). Soon after his nomination to a position on the International Court of Justice in 1955,
Judge Lauterpacht submitted a "Provisional Report on the Revision of the Statute of the
Court," an internal document of the Court, in which he "proposed that either the Court's
indication of interim measures of protection should be made binding or that faculty should
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The absence of a provision for interim measures in the FTA is
further emphasized by its clear availability under the parties' re-
spective domestic arbitration laws. Under United States law, "the
authority of arbitrators to grant interim relief comes from their in-
herent powers to conduct the arbitral proceedings and, more spe-
cifically, any additional authority granted to them in the contract
of the parties."'32 In Sperry International Trade, Inc. v. Govern-
ment of Israel,32 7 the agreement between the parties included the
language "neither party shall be precluded from seeking provi-
sional remedies in the courts of any jurisdiction including, but not
limited to, temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunc-
tions, .. *328 In Sperry, the Second Circuit affirmed an interim
remedy in the form of an injunction granted by the arbitrators
pending the resolution of a breach of contract dispute.3 29 The court
held that "New York Law requires that all reasonable efforts be
made to find a ground on which to sustain [the arbitrators' or-
der]. ' 330 The court further stated that
we have been cited to no principle of law, from New York or else-
where, preventing the arbitrators in such circumstances from rul-
ing that the [amount of a letter of credit] be held in the names of
both parties until the contract disputes are determined.
Rather, New York law gives arbitrators substantial power to
fashion remedies that they believe will do justice between the
parties.33'
In reality, an interim or a final award by an arbitrator in pri-
vate commercial arbitration can only be enforced by a competent
court. Thus, United States courts have been receptive to requests
for interim relief filed by the parties directly with the court during
the arbitration. Since the Federal Arbitration Act does not provide
for interim relief in domestic or international private commercial
arbitration and the issue is left to state law, many states have codi-
be completely abolished." Id.
-20 Hoellering, supra note 308, at 22.
27 689 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982). This decision was preceded by Sperry Int'l Trade v.
Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1982), which involved provisional relief granted by
the district court at an earlier stage of the case.
328 Sperry, 689 F.2d at 301.
3'29 Id. at 307.
30 Id. at 306 (citing Moyer v. Van-Dye-Way, 126 F.2d 339, 341 (3rd Cir. 1942);
Fudickar v. Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 401 (1875)).
33, Id. (citing Sprinze v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 629 (1979) (quotations omitted)).
1993]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
fled provisions allowing for interim relief.3 32 In Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770,-"' the United States Supreme
Court wrote that
The effectiveness of [arbitration] agreements would be greatly re-
duced if injunctive relief were withheld. Indeed, the very purpose
of arbitration procedure ... is to provide a mechanism for the
expeditious settlement of industrial disputes .. . .This basic
purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate,
effective remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed
to obviate. 334
Therefore, the Court upheld the arbitrators' preliminary injunctive
relief.335
In confronting requests for interim relief pending arbitration,
United States courts generally must determine whether a party has
made a prima facie showing of irreparable harm if the relief is not
granted, and a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Courts,
however, are reluctant to grant interim relief where such action
would be perceived as intruding on the arbitrators' authority." 6
Other reasons for such reluctance are "fear that such relief may
unduly influence the arbitrator's decision on the merits, cause
needless expense or delay of the arbitration, and most importantly
in international arbitration, subject a foreign party to laws with
which it is not familiar. '3 37
Israeli arbitration law also gives the arbitrator extensive pow-
ers to issue interim orders both on substantive issues338 and with
respect to procedural and evidentiary issues.3 3 9 The arbitrator may
also issue a declaratory judgment, an injunction, an order, and any
relief that the court is authorized to grant, or the arbitrator may
332 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-422 (1958); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 235,
§§ G-H (West 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.04.130 (West 1961). Some states included
such provisions in their laws regulating private international commercial arbitration. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.91-1297.95 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.01-
684.35 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-30 to 9-9-43; HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 658D-1 to
658D-9 (1988); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2B-01 to 3-213-09 (1990); Tax. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 249-1 to 249-43 (West 1989).
398 U.S. 235 (1970).
"' Id. at 249.
335 Id. at 254.
338 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286, 1292 (8th
Cir. 1984).
317 Hoellering, supra note 308, at 25.
'" Haborerut, supra note 79, § 16(b).
339 Id. app. § 8.
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issue an intermediary award deciding the arbitration in part.340
In conclusion, as stated by the Supreme Court in Boys Mar-
kets, "the effectiveness of [arbitration] agreements would be
greatly reduced if injunctive relief were withheld. 341 As described
above, injunctive relief is commonly acceptable in both domestic
and international arbitration law and institutions, and its inclusion
in the document that constitutes the source of power for the arbi-
trators is essential for a successful performance of their duties.
Though the absence of such provision from the U.S.-Israel FTA
does not conclusively negate the Panel's power to grant such in-
terim relief at the request of a Party, the Agreement should be
amended by the Joint Committee to explicitly include such a pro-
vision. Note that the necessity of making the Panel's award bind-
ing, and the need to publish it, as discussed earlier, apply fully to
partial awards or interim orders which would be issued by the
Panel under that authority.
At this juncture, it should be noted that interim relief is even
more essential in the context of politically sensitive disputes,
where a lengthy process of arbitrating may cause a dispute to esca-
late out of proportion. The Middle East is known for its high emo-
tions and long history of resolvable disputes escalating into blood-
shed. In a somewhat utopic era of a Middle-East free trade zone, a
limited dispute between nation-parties as to the proper interpreta-
tion of their free trade agreement (for example, with respect to
water rights or free access to a specialty market) might be used to
opportunistically fuel ancient political fevers, and thus carries the
risk of mushrooming into a dark, shadowing cloud. A binding in-
ternational arbitration mechanism is probably the best means
available for effectively defusing such disputes. However, some dis-
putes may only worsen with the passage of time. Thus, the availa-
bility of an interim power, which would enable the arbitrators to
eliminate, temporarily, an allegedly illegitimate measure taken by
one of the nation-parties, subject to the final outcome of the arbi-
tration, is necessary to deal effectively with time-sensitive disputes.
Otherwise, a panel of arbitrators might find itself laboring schol-
arly in the production of a just solution to a dispute, while the
parties' extremists are already cocking their guns.
340 Id. app. § 17; see also C.A. 177/83, S.B.M., Ltd. v. Agudat Kibutz Galil Yam, P/D
38(4) 718 (arbitrator may issue partial awards, and content of award-not its ti-
tle-determines whether arbitrator has not yet completed proceeding).
:1 Boys' Markets, 398 U.S. at 249.
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3. Supplemental, Remedies
The old concept of functus officio, or, "function performed," is
a commonly cited barrier to the issuance of a supplemental award
by arbitrators; once the arbitrators have concluded their proceed-
ings and issued a final award, their duties and powers are com-
pleted and become void.'2 In the case of Loyal Band or Group of
Creek Indians v. United States,343 the Senate, acting as an arbitra-
tor, awarded the Indians 1.2 million dollars in compensation for
losses resulting from the Civil War.3 4 The Indian Claims Commis-
sion issued a supplemental award changing the Senate's award, but
was reversed by the Court of Claims, which held that "[it is a]
generally accepted doctrine that once an arbitrator has made his
award, the rights of the parties to that award are vested and can-
not be destroyed by a later attempted modification of his
award." 345
It is quite common to find provisions in both international ar-
bitration agreements and institutions allowing for correction of
clerical or arithmetical errors in the award, for interpretation of
unclear language, for a corrective revision of the award, or for a
supplemental award addressing issues which were raised by the
parties, but not addressed by the first award. 46 Similar "technical
correctional powers" can be found in United States arbitration
law347 and Israeli arbitration law.3 48
The power to rectify its final Report, at least with respect to
technical errors, if not with respect to substantive omissions,
should be part of the Panel's powers to resolve a dispute under the
FTA, but no such procedure is offered by the FTA. A provision
which seems to solve this problem was included in the later Can-
ada-U.S. FTA. It provides for the Panel to present to the parties
"an initial report," containing findings of facts and determinations
as to the subject matter of the dispute. "Where visible," the par-
ties are afforded the opportunity to comment on that "initial re-
342 See DOMKE, supra note 63, at 337.
1,3 97 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
344 Id.
'" Id. at 431.
316 See, e.g., IACICA Convention, supra note 214, arts. 35-37; 1CSI1D Convention, supra
note 148, arts. 48-50; UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 33; UNCITRAL RuLEs,
supra note 157, art. 37.
147 See DOmKE, supra note 63, at 451-52 (citing cases).
348 Haborerut, supra note 78, § 22.
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port" and may submit to the panel a written, reasoned statement
of objections. Only then may the panel issue its final report.3 49 It is
desirable that the Joint Committee amend the U.S.-Israel FTA to
include a procedure similar to the one adopted by its younger
counterpart. Its benefits are clear, namely, an opportunity for the
Panel to finalize and perfect its Report, and the prevention of a
supplemental dispute leading into renewed proceedings altogether.
G. Process and Procedure-The Role of the Panel
Consistent with the idea of a non-binding arbitration and their
official reluctance to submit a dispute to a Panel's independent
judgment outside of bureaucratic control, the drafters of the FTA
did not specify any rules for defining the nature of the proceedings
under the dispute resolution mechanism of the FTA, or the role of
the Panel. The Agreement simply provides that "[t]he Panel shall
establish its own rules of procedure. 350 This lack of specificity
constitutes yet another reflection of the officials' fearful attitude
towards effective arbitration. It is not, therefore, a surprise that
the Joint Committee has failed to publish any supplemental rules
of procedure under the Agreement.
The later Canada-U.S. FTA, though somewhat more detailed
as to the Panel's procedure, has been followed by the issuance of
"Model Rules of Procedure. 351 However, under those rules, the
Panel is strictly limited to the parties' arguments and submissions,
and cannot investigate or summon witnesses and documents with-
out the parties' agreement.5 2
The exclusion of any guidelines for the Panel when determin-
ing its own procedure and the lack of clear authorization for the
Panel to determine independently the admissibility of evidence,
the need for further submission, the appointment of an indepen-
dent expert, or the conduction of independent investigation and
research is arguably rooted in the "adversary system," which is the
S See Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1807(5)-(6), 27 LL.M. at 385.
U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19(1)(d), 24 I.L.M. at 665.
"' See Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter 16 Panels; United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, 54 Fed. Reg. 14,372 (1989). Additional rules of procedure were issued
under chapter 19, article 1904 of that agreement. Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Bina-
tional Panel Reviews, 53 Fed. Reg. 53,212 (1988).
352 Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 73, art. 1807(4), 27 I.L.M. at 385 ("Panel shall base
its decision on the arguments and submissions of the Parties."); Model Rules of Procedure,
§ VI(2), 54 Fed. Reg. at 14,373 (panel may not proceed in absence of one party).
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chosen nature of both parties' judicial systems.-
In the United States,
[t]he central premise of the system is that the truth will become
evident when opposing interests vigorously present their self-in-
terested positions to a neutral arbiter. That arbiter is expected to
apply its existing knowledge and life experience but is not ordina-
rily called upon to investigate disputed facts. Indeed, the arbiter
is usually prohibited from doing so.35s
This rule has not been strictly followed with respect to indepen-
dent use of new legal arguments by the courts.35" As Tomashefsky
argues, "the reality of the adversary system often differs signifi-
cantly from the ideal. ' 355 For example, the Supreme Court, in Bus-
iness Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,
Inc.,5 ' stated that "[t]he District Court considered [the submis-
sion] suspicious and so conducted its own investigation into the
allegations of copying. The District Judge's law clerk spent one
hour telephoning the businesses named in the [submitted] listings,
only to discover ... incorrect information. 3 57 Tomashefsky cor-
rectly indicates that the Court showed a "lack of concern about the
district court's departure from the ordinary procedures of the ad-
versary system. '3 58
The continental "inquisitorial system," in contrast, offers the
arbiter, or the judge, extensive powers to independently investigate
the facts, without interference from the parties. Its advantages be-
come clearer in cases in which the parties are misrepresented by
advocates who possess conflicting interests, or in any case in which
a thorough development of the facts conflicts with powerful, exter-
nal factors. In comparison with the adversary system, the inquisi-
torial system enjoys certain advantages:
When the truth is in doubt, there is no shame for the adversary
system in admitting that it produces "litigation truth" as best it
"I See C. Steven Tomashefsky, We Do Have An Adversary System, Don't We?, 18
LrIG. 23, 23 (Fall 1991).
3" See, e.g., Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1988)
(circuit judge introducing issue of whether suit involved actual case or controversy suitable
for federal jurisdiction); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 415 (1986) (district judge
erred in dismissing claim sua sponte in that he became "a proponent rather than an inde-
pendent entity" (citation omitted)).
311 Tomashefsky, supra note 353, at 23.
35- 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
357 Id. at 539.
"I" Tomashefsky, supra note 353, at 23.
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can. But it is hard to justify a system set up to ignore truth that
can be discovered. Nor should we advocate a policy that tempts
people to make false allegations, hoping that the other side is too
incompetent to catch them.3 59
Israel, whose legal system is a first-tier offspring of the British
Common Law, also runs its judiciary under the helm of the adver-
sary system. "[I]t is the parties who determine the scope of the
conflict, and it is they who lay the evidentiary base for solving
it." 360 "As a result," Justice Barak notes, "the court may obtain
only a partial picture, which does not sufficiently take into account
the interests either of third parties or of the public as a whole. 3 6' 1
Comparatively, the adversary system's main advantage is "that it
guarantees the judge's objectivity in the eyes of the parties,"
whereas "the inquisitorial system, which imposes the task of inves-
tigation and demands on the judge himself, damages this
notion.
'36 2
One may rightly argue, however, that the parties' choice of fol-
lowing the adversary system as the model for their respective judi-
ciaries has no bearing on their choice of a passive, powerless form
of arbitration under the FTA. Its form should be influenced,
rather, by the essence of arbitration-the complete dominion of
the arbitrators over the process, the maximal flexibility in proce-
dural and inquisitorial powers, and the production of an expedient
and informed determination. An analysis of the rules of arbitra-
tion, both of international institutions and the parties' respective
arbitration laws, supports that argument and sheds, yet again, a
cliquish light on the FTA's dispute resolution mechanism.
The constitution of a passive, or even submissive, panel is not
found in the agreement between Israel and Egypt to arbitrate the
Taba boundary dispute. 63 Rather, it provided that "[a]t any time
during the arbitral proceedings the Tribunal may call upon either
party to produce additional documents or other evidence relevant
to the question .... Any documents or other evidence so produced
Id. at 25 (citing John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 866 (1985)). Contra Arthur S. Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Su-
preme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1975) (when courts seek out facts indepen-
dently, integrity of adversarial system is jeopardized).
360 BARAK, supra note 292, at 178.
3061 Id.
362 Id.
363 See Taba Beach Front Agreement, supra note 123.
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shall also be provided to the other party." 64 That agreement fur-
ther provided that "the Tribunal may request that a nonparty to
this Compromise provide to it documents or other evidence rele-
vant to the question." 65 The latter provision can be interpreted as
providing authority for calling a nonparty to testify before the
Tribunal.
Similar powers are given to arbitrators under the ICC Rules,3 6
the AAA Rules, 67 the IACICA Conventions8 and the UNCITRAL
Model Law and Rules.3 69 The AAA Rules provide the arbitrator
with even greater investigatory powers: whenever the arbitrator
deems it
necessary to make an inspection or investigation in connection
with the arbitration, [the parties shall be notified and] . . .[a]ny
party who so desires may be present at such a inspection or inves-
tigation. In the event that one or all parties are not present at the
inspection or investigation, the arbitrator shall make a verbal or
written report to the parties and afford them an opportunity to
comment.
3 7 0
The contention that an arbitration process should not be
tightly confined into an adversary-system-styled harness is further
confirmed by the arbitration laws of the parties. Under United
States law, "[i]t is a well-established principle of arbitration law
and practice that the usual common-law rules regarding the admis-
sion and rejection of evidence are not strictly observed in arbitra-
tion. 31 7 1 In addition, "[a]rbitrators have, of course, the discretion
to solicit evidence by questioning a witness themselves; they may
3" Id. art. 111(3).
365 Id. art. III(4).
3'" ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 14 (arbitrator given power to call experts or any
other person).
367 AAA RULES, supra note 177, § 31 ("The parties ... shall produce such evidence as
the Arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and determination of the
dispute.").
368 IACICA Convention, supra note 214, arts. 24(3), 25(6) ("The Arbitral Tribunal shall
determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence ....").
369 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 19(2) ("[A]rbitral tribunal may...
conduct the arbitration in such a manner as it considers appropriate."); UNCITRAL RULES,
supra note 157, art. 24(3) (tribunal may elicit more evidence).
370 AAA RULES, supra note 177, § 33.
171 DOMKE, supra note 63, § 24:02 at 364 (citing Frantz v. Inter-Ins. Exch. of Auto.
Club, 229 Cal. App. 2d 269 (Ct. App. 1964); Robert Coulson, Appropriate Procedures for
Receiving Proof in Commercial Arbitration, 71 DICK. L. REV. 63, 65 (1966) (procedure is
flexible granting arbitrator wide discretion).
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also request a party's attorney to produce additional evidence
which they consider pertinent for support or disallowance of the
claim. '"37 2 However, the receipt of additional, self-solicited evidence
should be done only in the presence of the parties or their counsel
to prevent an appearance of prejudice .3 73 For example, the court in
Oinoussian S.S. Corp. v. Sabre Shipping Corp.374 held that the ap-
pointment of arbitrators who were experts in the subject matter of
the arbitration indicated the parties' intent to grant wide authority
to the experts to use their own knowledge and facts of specialty. 7 5
The court stated, "clearly the parties contemplated that [the arbi-
trators'] specialized knowledge of the trade would be applied; in
effect, it would be carrying coals to Newcastle to require presenta-
tion of evidence to experts in the field. '"37 6
Additionally, United States law permits independent investi-
gation by the arbitrator, which is viewed as part of the hearing and
presentation of evidence. However, the law requires that such in-
vestigation should be done only in the presence of the parties.37 7
The parties' presence, however, may be waived in certain
circumstances. 37 1
Israeli arbitration law similarly deviates from the adversary
system. It provides that the arbitrator may summon witnesses or
documents as the arbitrator sees fit379 and states that the arbitra-
tor is not bound by substantive law, evidentiary rules, or any rules
of procedure customary in [a] court of law.380 However, a party
may request, and the court may order, that the arbitrator consult
372 See DoMKE, supra note 63, 24:02 at 366.
171 See In re Chevron Transp. Corp. v. Astro Vencedor Compania Naviera S.A., 300 F.
Supp. 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
37" 224 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
171 Id. at 809.
376 Id.
3 See DohiKE, supra note 63, §24:04 at 375-76; see also Hutchins Constr. Co. v. Bell,
396 F. Supp. 1262, 1263-64 (D. Va. 1975) (both parties must stipulate to hearing to present
additional evidence); Ferris Constr. Co. v. Lasher, 381 N.Y.S.2d 352, 353 (App. Div. 1976)
(no misconduct where arbitrator's inspection not objected to on time); 290 Park Ave. v.
Fergus Motors, Inc., 90 N.Y.S.2d 613, 613 (App. Div. 1949) (investigation by own initiative
of arbitrator held "misbehavior"); Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitories, Inc. v. Gunter,
230 S.E.2d 380, 388 (N.C. 1976) (misconduct where arbitrator conducts investigation in ab-
sence of one of parties).
"I See DortKE, supra note 63, at 378-79 (silent consent of party deemed waiver).
171 Haborerut, supra note 79, § 13 and app. § 8.
28o See id. app. § 14; see also C.A. 584/72, Ziploviz v. Kaplan, P/D 27(2), 705 (arbitra-
tor not bound by any rules of procedure, but should consider benefits of transcript of hear-
ing); C.A. 266/83, Uda v. Tivony, P]D 39(2), 632.
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the court with respect to questions of law, where the parties have
agreed that the arbitrator is bound by substantive law, and the
questions are of special importance.3 1l
The authority to appoint an independent expert was also left
out of the FTA Panel's charter. The use of experts is a favored tool
in arbitration, as it enables the arbitrators to enjoy the benefit of
an objective and professional report submitted on the basis of an
independent investigation free of the parties' influence and moti-
vation. Such unabridged authority is given by the ICC Rules,382 the
IACICA Convention,383 and the UNCITRAL Model Law8 4 and
Rules 85, which require the parties to fully cooperate with the ex-
perts' requests for any documents or materials, and afford the par-
ties the opportunity to comment on the expert's report and to in-
terrogate the expert during a special hearing. The authority to
appoint an expert can also be found in United States8 6 and Is-
raeli38 7 arbitration law.
In conclusion, the FTA fails to set forth any substantive pro-
cedural authority, or investigatory powers, for the Panel. As was
correctly stated, "[a]rbitration in its essence is procedure, and as
any experienced lawyer knows, procedure governs and shapes sub-
stance. 38  Though the lack of established rules may be interpreted
as giving the Panel a free hand in setting its own procedure, it is
reasonable to expect the parties to quarrel over each and every one
of such initiatives, thus rendering arbitration under the FTA an
exercise in tedium. In fact, the Parties' failure to grant the Panel
an adequately flexible procedural framework outlining the Panel's
role amounts to an intentional crippling of the arbitration process.
381 Hm. 129/63, Epstein v. Epstein, P/D 17, 1170.
382 ICC RULES, supra note 165, art. 14(2) ("The arbitrator may appoint one or more
experts, define their terms of reference, receive their reports and/or hear them in person.").
383 IACICA Convention, supra note 214, art. 27.
384 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 156, art. 26.
385 UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 157, art. 27.
388 See, e.g., Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 289 P.2d 476, 479 (Cal. 1955)
(en banc) (holding that arbitrator may seek opinion of expert attorney); Sapp v. Barenfeld,
212 P.2d 233, 239 (Cal. 1949) (en banc) (ruling in construction case that arbitrators may
"enlist the aid of a trained appraiser in determining the amount of the award"); Litman v.
Holtzman, 149 A.2d 385, 389 (Md. 1959) (holding arbitrator may call upon expert when
settling contract disputes).
'87 Haborerut, supra note 79, app. § 12; see also C.F. (Tel Aviv) 2771/82, C.F. (Tel
Aviv) 2663/82, Ryten v. Lazer, Psakim 1987(1), 358 (arbitrators should allow party to be
represented by attorney with respect to that party's demand for appointment of indepen-
dent expert by arbitrators).
388 See 1 WETTER, supra note 1, at xxiii.
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Only a Panel equipped with the necessary investigatorial powers
and a "do-what-it-takes" charter can convert the FTA's (or any
other international agreement's) dispute resolution mechanism
into what it should be-an effective; expedient, and practical
process.
H. Private-Sector Access to the Forum
The FTA dispute resolution mechanism clearly provides
standing solely to the parties. No private-sector entity, individual
or corporate, can initiate or participate in the dispute resolution
process under the FTA.s89 In outlining the goals of the parties in
establishing the FTA, the preamble of the Agreement mentions the
promotion of "mutual relations," the strengthening and developing
of "economic relations," the contribution to "harmonious develop-
ment and expansion of world trade," and the promotion of "coop-
eration in areas which are of mutual interest. 3 9 0 Indeed, in creat-
ing a commercial agreement between them for their "mutual
benefit," parties do not normally provide third parties with access
to their arbitration." 1 Query: should that be the case with interna-
tional free trade agreements? Who are the real parties or the real
beneficiaries to a free trade agreement?
A more careful analysis of the Agreement shows confusion as
to the identity of the real players in the free trade ballgame. The
"governments-only approach" is expressed more than once, as the
two nations "establish[ed] . . . a Free Trade Area [in order to]
eliminate the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
on trade between the two nations in products originating
therein." 3 2 The Agreement provides protection to "[p]roducts of
Israel"393 and "[piroducts of the United States. 3 94 Similarly, the
"'1 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 19, 24 I.L.M. at 664-65. Article 19 provides
only for a party to invoke the process or take action to initiate a panel proceeding. Id.
Article 1 defines "the parties" as the "governments of the United States of America and
Israel." Id. art. 1.
-0 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, preamble, 24 I.L.M. at 657.
191 See, e.g., United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, § 5,
Pub. L. No. 99-47, 99 Stat. 82, 84 ("Neither the entry into force of the Agreement with
respect to the United States, nor the enactment of this Act, shall be construed as creating
any private right of action or remedy for which provision is not explicitly made under this
Act or under the laws of the United States.").
392 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 1, 24 I.L.M. at 657 (emphasis added).
393 Id. art. 2(1), 24 I.L.M. at 658.
3- Id. art. 2(2), 24 I.L.M. at 658.
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Agreement provides that "[n]either Party shall impose import i-
censing requirements on items exported by the other Party."39 In
outlining the functions of the Joint Committee, 9 6 the agreement
does not provide for the Joint Committee to communicate with
private-sector entities, such as producers or export-import players,
or even imply in any way that such communications are desira-
ble. 97 While requiring that "[b]efore either Party takes any trade
measure with respect to products traded between the Parties, it
shall provide prior written notice to the other Party as far in ad-
vance as may be practicable,13 8 the agreement does not require
any publication of such notice to the private-sector, nor does it of-
fer interested private entities a chance to comment on such a pro-
posed trade measure.
However, even the most carefully crafted language could not
void the underlying fact: the real players in free trade are private-
sector entities, such as entrepreneurs, manufacturers, exporters,
and importers. Outside of the gradually dissolving Eastern-bloc,
China, and other dictatorships, governments rarely trade among
themselves, but individuals and corporations do.s 9  Indeed, the
Agreement's language indirectly acknowledges this fact. For exam-
ple, the Agreement provides for Consultations in cases where "a
product is being imported in such increased quantities as to be a
substantial cause of serious injury or the threat thereof to domestic
producers of like or directly competitive products."400 Similarly,
the Agreement provides that
[n]either party shall impose, as a condition of establishment, ex-
pansion or maintenance of investments by nationals or compa-
nies of the other Party, requirements to export any amount of
production resulting from such investments or to purchase lo-
395 Id. art. 12(1), 24 I.L.M. at 661 (emphasis added).
"' See supra notes 187-195 and accompanying text (discussing functions of Joint
Committee).
37 See U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 17, 24 I.L.M. at 663-64.
:98 Id. art. 18(1)(a), 24 LL.M. at 664.
19 See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text (discussing scope of trade between
Parties as divided into military imports and private-sector trade and investments). Note
that even a typical government procurement contract, such as the purchase of fighter
planes, would have a private manufacturer on at least one side of the deal.
,00 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 3, art. 5(1), 24 I.L.M. at 658 (emphasis added); see also
id. art. 5(2), 24 I.L.M. at 658-59. ("Neither Party shall take an action which provides solely
for a suspension of the reduction or elimination of any duty provided for by this Agreement
unless the serious injury or threat thereof which is substantially caused by imports to the
domestic producers . . . .") (emphasis added).
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cally-produced goods and services. Moreover, neither Party shall
impose requirements on investors to purchase locally-produced
goods and services as a condition for receiving any type of govern-
mental incentives.40 1
Thus, the Agreement recognizes the major role played by "domes-
tic producers," "investors," and, in general, "nationals or compa-
nies of the other Party."
Realizing that private-sector entities are the real beneficiaries
of a free trade agreement and are also those who are supposed to
fill it with life and thus determine its failure or success, the ques-
tion remains: should private-sector entities have access to the dis-
pute resolution mechanism under the FTA and a right to initiate
proceedings thereunder? The drafters of the Agreement, and simi-
larly, the drafters of the later Canada-U.S. FTA, thought the an-
swer to be in the negative.40 2
Granting private-sector entities a right to initiate and partici-
pate in arbitration under an international agreement and oppose a
foreign nation would not, in any way, be a novelty in international
law. In the context of claims resulting from military conflicts, ac-
cess for individuals to international arbitration was introduced as
early as 1927 under the German-Polish Convention relating to Up-
per Silesia.40° Even before that, some of the treaties that followed
the First World War provided for mixed claims commissions, in
which individuals and corporations were able to assert, before an
independent tribunal, monetary and proprietary claims against
foreign nations.404 More recently, individuals and corporations
were allowed to submit claims to the Iran-U.S Claims Tribunal
under the Claims Settlement Declaration of 1981.405 The individu-
als filing claims with the Iran-U.S. Tribunal were fully responsible
for presenting their cases.
In addition to claims resulting from war, individuals may as-
401 Id. art. 13, 24 LL.M. at 662 (emphasis added); see also United States-Israel Free
Trade Implementation Act of 1985, H.R. Rep. No. 99-64, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985),
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 61, 63. (discussing products of the private-sector of Israel).
402 See Azriell, supra note 12, at 433.
"o0 KECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATiONAL ExPENIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA 482 (1942).
'4 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 325, at 67. Lauterpacht mentions, for example, The
Treaty of Versailles, art. 304; The Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, art. 256; The Treaty
of Trianon with Hungary, art. 239; The Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, art. 188; and The
Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey, art. 92. Id. at n.11.
405 See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 325, at 69-70 (noting that "the Declaration gave ac-
cess to the Tribunal principally to US nationals").
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sert claims against nations to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whose reports are consid-
ered to be non-binding "views. '40 6 Similarly, the Law of the Sea
Tribunal under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea pro-
vides for access to individuals and corporations in certain cases in-
volving maritime claims.407
An additional example of an international arbitration forum
that provides access to individuals asserting claims against govern-
ments is the ICSID Convention.40 8 Its preamble provides that
"[c]onsidering the need for international cooperation for economic
development, and the role of private international investment
therein ... [and] [b]earing in mind the possibility that from time
to time disputes may arise in connection with such investment be-
tween Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting
States," the nation-signatories to the Convention attach "particu-
lar importance to the availability of facilities for international con-
ciliation or arbitration to which Contracting States and nationals
of other Contracting States may submit such disputes if they so
desire. '409 Thus, in an area so closely related to trade, the nation-
signatories found that their desire to encourage foreign invest-
ments is followed by the duty to provide private-sector individual
and corporate investors with adequate protection in the form of
access to a binding arbitration forum. The ICSID Convention,
which is formulated under the auspices of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), embodies
the recognition, which should be followed by international trade
agreement negotiators, that the achievement of a free flow of in-
vestments can only be attained by recognizing the rights of inves-
'06 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Proto-
col, Vols. 1 and 2, UN docs. CCPR-C-OP-1 and 2 (1985 and 1990); see also H. LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 56-57 (1950). Judge Lauterpacht argues that indi-
viduals should have a right of access to the International Court of Justice in cases concern-
ing Human Rights. Id.; see also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 325, at 30-31 (discussing the juris-
diction of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
40I See, e.g., 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982, A COMMEN-
TARY 290-291 (Myron H. Nordquist ed., 1985) (presenting art. 187(c), (d), (e) of the United
Nations Convention on the law of the Sea, which grants the Sea-Bed Chamber jurisdiction
over cases involving individuals); see also id. Vol. 5, at 6 (noting access for individuals).
40I See ICSID Convention, supra note 148, art. 1(2).
409 Id. As of the end of 1989, ninety-one nations had become signatories to the ICSID
Convention. ICSID, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 6.
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tors to defend their positions during disputes.410 Similarly, the
Model BIT, which was signed between the United States and nu-
merous other nations,411 provides in its Preamble that the treaty is
signed by the parties
[d]esiring to promote greater economic cooperation between
them, particularly with respect to investments by nationals and
companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party; and
recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded
such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties ....11411
Thus, the Model Bit provides nationals or companies from one na-
tion-party with access to "settlement by conciliation or binding
arbitration. '413
The FTA was signed, it is assumed, with a similar desire to
promote trade between the parties through individuals and corpo-
rations. It is difficult to understand, therefore, what differentiates
the rights of investors, and the protections required to lure them,
from what it takes to encourage trading entities.1 4 The acceptance,
110 See ICSID Convention, supra note 148, art. 25(2)(a). The ICSID Convention pro-
vides access to arbitration for "any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting
State other than the state party to the dispute." Id.; see also id. art. 25(2)(b) (providing
access to arbitration for "any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting
State other than the State party to the dispute").
411 See Model BIT, supra note 143; supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing BITs).
'12 Model Bit, supra note 143, Preamble.
413 Id. art. VI(3)(a) (emphasis added).
"I A related field is international taxation, where Lindencrona and Mattesson proposed
the establishment of an international forum for arbitrating private claims of over-taxation
by a foreign country. See LINDENCRONA & MATTESSON, supra note 260. Presently, tax trea-
ties provide for "grievance procedure," under which" 'in the case of the Grievance Provision
where strict application of the Contracting States' internal rules would preclude agreement,
the competent authorities can have regard to considerations of equity in order to give the
tax payer satisfaction." Thus, the "Mutual Agreement: Grievance" provision, which is found
in nearly every U.S. income tax treaty, gives authority to a competent agency of a Con-
tracting State to settle a particular case or controversy with an individual tax fare, or a class
of tax payer. See J. Ross MACDONALD, 5 ANNOTATED TopicAL GUIDE TO U.S. INcohiE TAX
TREATIES 4445-46 (Supp. 1991); see also TREMBLAY & GARNETT, THE NEW CANADA-U.S. TAX
CONVENTION 183 (1985) ("Thus, a resident of Canada must present to the Minister of Na-
tional Revenue (or his authorized representative) any claim that such resident is being sub-
jected to taxation contrary to the Convention."); Model Double Taxation-Convention on
Income and on Capital, Report of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs 42, 175 (1977). It
should be noted, however, that the right of taxation is widely perceived as a foundation of
sovereignty, and therefore, it is unlikely that a government would surrender its taxation
discretion to an independent foreign arbiter. See LiNDENCRONA & MATTESSON, supra note
260, at 16-20.
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though limited, of access by individuals to international tribunals
reflects the fact that "the problem in such instances is not one of
any legal restriction on the procedural status of individuals [before
international tribunals] but rather of lack of political will... [and]
there is no doctrinal or procedural obstacle to giving individuals a
direct right of access to human rights tribunals. '"41
As Toope correctly stated, there are two major hurdles to arbi-
tration between states and individuals, or, to what he calls "the
delocalization of arbitral procedural law." First, "is it possible to
insulate an international arbitration from the application of proce-
dural rules of the lex loci arbitri?" Second, "is it possible for the
parties to agree, or in the absence of agreement, for an arbitrator
to apply to the substance of a dispute a system of law divorced
from any single national system? '416 Toope concludes that those
questions may, with caution, be answered in the positive.417 Even
though private persons and nations obviously do not enjoy equal
status in international law, one should not ignore the fact that in-
dividuals deal with nations and vice versa. Thus, in the absence of
a substantive international legal barrier to affording a private-sec-
tor entity equal standing in international arbitration, and in recog-
nition of the fact that those private-sector entities are the intended
beneficiaries under a free trade agreement, the FTA should pro-
vide for such access to its dispute resolution mechanism. 418
At this crossroad, realizing that private-sector entities do not,
as of yet, enjoy a right of access to panels under the FTA, a refer-
ence should be made to avenues open to an individual or a corpo-
ration seeking to remedy an illegitimate trade measure taken
against it by the other party.419 When facing such a situation, the
first step would be for the trader to approach its government offi-
cials in charge of implementing the FTA, or its government's rep-
resentative to the Joint Committee, and request action. As noted
415 LAUTERPACHT, supra note 325, at 68.
416 STEPHEN J. ToOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, STUDIES IN ARBITRATION BE-
TWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 17 (1990).
"11 Id. at 19-45.
418 See DoMKE, supra note 63, § 24:01, at 362 (citing McKinney Drilling Co. v. Mach I
Ltd., 359 A.2d 100 (Md. Ct. App. 1976). Note that, under U.S. arbitration law, the arbitrator
is authorized and has the discretion to allow an interested third-party to be heard. Id.
419 For example, an exporter from the U.S. to Israel believes that its shipped goods are
subject to illegitimate duties, or that their delivery to a local customer is blocked by an
illegitimate requirement of licensing. Similarly, an Israeli exporter may find itself facing
such measures imposed by U.S. authorities.
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previously, however, trade officials may well have other priorities
and might refuse a private request to initiate a dispute resolution
process. In such a case, could an individual or a corporation force a
trade official to act on its behalf?
Both in Israel and in the United States, a person who bonsid-
ers himself injured by an administrative action or omission can ob-
tain judicial scrutiny of the agency's discretion. A full discussion of
that topic is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a brief look
shows how burdensome, or in the context of private commercial
activity, even impractical such a proceeding may be.
In the United States, the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946420 ("APA") provides a detailed procedure for court review of
bureaucratic discretion based on "the regularization of administra-
tive processes, the presumptive availability of judicial review, and
judicial deference to administrative expertise-expertise being it-
self a rational and professional constraint against arbitrariness.
421
In Israel, where administrative law concepts are a hybrid of
pre-1948 British law, original law, and selective adoption of United
States ideas, the only court which can seize jurisdiction over a
claim by an individual against a governmental agency, where the
requested remedy is an order, is the Supreme Court of Israel, while
sitting as the High Court of Justice.422 Under Israeli administrative
420 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
421 CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 4 (1990). Edley provides an extensive discussion of the various legal concepts
underlining U.S. administrative law and expresses strong criticism of its shortcomings and
overly-burdensome processes with respect to the complaining individual. Edley defines the
standards of scrutiny as follows: "A court... determines the appropriate degree of defer-
ence based on its assessment of (1) whether the agency employed the right method of deci-
sion making ('This is a question for scientific expertise; don't decide it by applying partisan
ideology or interest group accommodation') and (2) whether the method was properly exe-
cuted ('Do the expert's numbers add up; was the agency adjudicator neutral?')." Id. at 3.
For a criticism of this framework, see Edley's chapter entitled, The Trichotomy's Concep-
tual Failings. Id. at 72-95; see also id. at 133-67 (discussing unsuccessful remedies). Case law
in this area is extensive, but the Supreme Court outlined its major concepts in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (outlin-
ing arbitrary or capricious standard for review); see also Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in
Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REV. 899, 900 (1943) (discussing difficulty in determining fact
or law with respect to judicial review of administrator proceedings); Warner W. Gardner,
Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 800,
800 (1975) (analyzing statistically degree of deference courts afford agencies); Robert L.
Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative Analysis,
58 HARv. L. REV. 70, 70 (1944) (discussing standards of review employed by courts when
reviewing administrative findings).
422 See Hok Yesod: Hashfita (Fundamental Law- Judiciary) (1984), reprinted in S.H.
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law, the High Court of Justice is authorized "to scrutinize the le-
gality of administrative decisions, almost without exceptions."42 3
With the exception of several limited-jurisdiction tribunals estab-
lished under specific laws,424 there exists a limited avenue for a col-
lateral attack of certain agency decisions in the district court.421 5 As
a consequence of its extensive jurisdiction, the Israeli Supreme
Court is comparatively much busier than the Supreme Court of the
United States or the British House of Lords.426 The right of
"standing" before the Israeli Supreme Court as a High Court of
Justice is limited to individuals or corporations that have a stake
in the outcome.427 As Professor Zamir concludes, "even after re-
peat[ed] attempts to clearly define the borderline between the ju-
risdiction of the High Court of Justice and the jurisdiction of the
district courts, the borderline is still vague, and it seems that the
justices themselves have given up on the possibility to solve that
enigma. "428 Thus, though judicial scrutiny of an agency's discretion
is available, the process is long and complex, both in Israel and the
United States.
In conclusion, it is clear that a private-sector importing or ex-
porting entity, when facing what it considers-an illegitimate trade
measure by the other nation-Party to the FTA, would be com-
P.F.N.V. 78, § 15(g) ("The Supreme Court would sit also as a High Court of Justice; sitting
as such, the Court would have jurisdiction over matters in which it finds the need to grant
remedies based on justice, and where those matters are not under the jurisdiction of any
other court or beith din."); see also Hok Bathey Hamishpat (Law of the Courts) (1957).
s ITZHAK ZAMIR, JUDGING ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS 1 (1981).
See id. at i, n.1 (listing laws).
425 See id. at 19-57; see also C.A. 213/56, The Attorney General v. Alexandrovich, P.D.
11, 695; C.A. 311/57, Attorney General v. M. Dizengorf, Inc., P.D. 13, 1026; C.A. 256/70,
Friedman v. City of Haifa, P.D. 24(2), 577.
420 See ZAMIR, supra note 423, at 85-86. The Israeli Supreme Court, with only twelve
justices, handles approximately ten times more cases than the Supreme Court of the U.S.
and approximately forty times more cases than the British House of Lords. Id. at 85-86.
4217 See B.G.Z. 394/72, B.G.Z. 410/72, France Hill Hotel, Inc. v. The Local Committee
for Planning, Jerusalem, P.D. 27(2) 324; B.G.Z. 384/71, Dodai v. Harel, P.D. 25(2) 554;
B.G.Z. 322/61, Shoshani v. City of Jerusalem, P.D. 27, 2117, 2116 ("It is settled law, not to
be rethought, that the High Court of Justice would not close its gates before a petitioner
just because he may be able to request a remedy in another court, if that remedy might not
be fast or effective enough.").
... ZAMIR, supra note 423, at 100. (citing C.A. 463/65, Tirat Hakrach, Inc., v. Appraisal
Committee of the City of Natanya, P.D. 20(2) 234, 238 ("To my regrets, the question of
jurisdictional division between the High Court of Justice and other competent courts is not
an easy one, and it is among our many sins that we have not yet been wise enough to
establish clear divisions in that field, and again litigants, lawyers and judges need to invest
time and energy in that futile debate")).
ARBITRATION
pletely dependent on the arbitrary discretion of its nation's repre-
sentative to the Joint Committee. As a private-sector entity, it
would have no access to the Agreement's dispute resolution mecha-
nism. Facing what it considers an unlawful failure to act on the
part of a government official, it would have to go to court. As this
brief review has shown, in both the United States and Israel, such
proceedings are possible, but they would be highly complicated,
both in procedure and in substance, lengthy, and thus, expensive.
Therefore, the need to litigate such an issue in court, before even
obtaining a panel review of the allegedly illegitimate measure,
would probably be impractical for private businesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The above discussion has examined each element of the dis-
pute resolution process under the U.S.-Israel FTA. The analysis
clearly shows a substantial need to amend the Agreement and mas-
sively supplement it in almost every aspect. As Judge Lauterpacht
wrote, "most so-called conflicts of interests are due, not to eco-
nomic necessities, but to the imperfections of international legal
organization, in particular to the legal admissibility of force and
the absence of judicial settlement."'429 The availability of a bind-
ing and effective dispute resolution mechanism is essential to the
success of an international agreement. In the case of the U.S.-
Israel FTA, more than its own success is at stake. The U.S.-Israel
FTA is the only free trade agreement signed by Israel until now
and hence constitutes the only available precedent for a free trade
zone encompassing Israel. Should the ongoing Middle East peace
talks produce the desired results, economic arrangements would
have to follow. In a region so engulfed by nationalism, free trade
would be the only acceptable compromise between a necessary eco-
nomic union and powerful nationalist sentiments.
It is essential that any future Middle East trade agreements
be equipped with a competent dispute resolution process to suc-
cessfully defuse disputes before certain escalation into bloodshed.
It is hoped that the suggestions made in this Article will serve in
the formation of such institutions.
"I LAUTERPACHT, supra note 325, at 2 (quoting H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933)) (emphasis added).
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